Nuclear C2 (Command and Control) has provisions for these types of scenarios through the usage of Permissive Action Links (PALs)[1].
Nuclear C2 (Command and Control) has provisions for these types of scenarios through the usage of Permissive Action Links (PALs)[1].
> It is feared that removing the weapons could signal the end of relations between the Nato allies, while leaving them in place could put the weapons of mass destruction at risk.
From your wikipedia link:
> The conventional explosives needed to start the chain reaction are tailored to the characteristics of the fissile material in the core of the weapon. If the detonation does not occur exactly as planned, such as in the case of a misfire, a nuclear reaction is unlikely to occur—the explosion will be no greater than the amount of conventional explosive (although radioactive material—the unreacted nuclear fuel—may be dispersed).
The anti-tamper protection results in a misfire.
One does not need to have a ballistic nuke to cause unspeakable damage. Misfire 50 nukes in a water supply, eg Lake Assad[1] and you could have a major humanitarian disaster on your hands.
If a misfire is safe against dispersal (as some googling indicates might be true), why not detonate them in a bunker, then retrieve the nuclear material for incorporation into a dirty bomb?
Now, yes thanks to PAL it may not be a risk like 9/11, but it's much more than a non-issue.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Water_supply_and_sanitation_in...
Also for education purposes, the B61s in question are stored in hardened "storage bunkers"[1] under the control of US personnel at the airbase.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weapons_Storage_and_Security_S...
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/launch-code-for-...
I'm sure there's a large group contractors who have fancy presentations and complex systems to protect nukes. They're very highly motivated, fiscally, to convince everyone they've done a good job. As for if that's actually the case, has there been any peer review?
However it would likely take weeks or even months of careful reverse engineering of the mechanisms involved.
The likely scenario if those nukes are put at risk is either some sort of a self destruct mechanism that is designed to disable to physics package without detonating the core itself and an immediate military response to deny any access to the area.
The US can stage in Greece, Cyprus and Israel if need be as well as Saudi Arabia not to mention that they can move a carrier group into the region fairly quickly.
And they would have to do so because if they don’t Russia is invading turkey in full force and after the purges in the Turkish military and their out dated equipment (they just rolled into a Syria in M60 Patton tanks) they don’t stand a chance against either really.
However even a hint of this being possible would likely end Erdogan’s regime over night.
To be clear the "detonation" is NOT the nuclear material going critical, or even a "dirty bomb" type explosion. It is akin to thermite on the electrical firing ICs/circuits to completely destroy the intelligent logic of managing the conventional explosives that triggers the nuclear material.
PU239 has a half life of 24,110 years and that's your best case for a dirty bomb, if the core is U235 then it has a half life of 703,800,000 years which means when it's not in any substantial mass in which the nuclear decay is can to turn into a chain reaction it's about as radioactive as cat litter or a banana.