> post-modernist theories of all-encompassing privilege hierarchies
Genuinely curious, what are you talking about ?
Genuinely curious, what are you talking about ?
He's talking about almost anyone engaging in ideas typically labeled "postmodernist" "poststructuralist" "critical race theory" "theory" "literary theory" and a couple of others, as well as persons engaging in fields called things like "ethnic studies" or "gender studies."
>But dressed up in sufficiently confusing language—see the Butler passage from earlier in this essay—no one can tell what if anything is really being argued.
As someone who has a cursory interest in critical theory, the passage was perfectly readable to me, especially if you're familiar with what the structuralists such as Althusser were arguing in the first place. The idea that it's only some ideological force that keeps deconstruction in play is false, since Althusser himself was sympathetic to the political goals of many deconstructioists - he was literally a Marxist and is heavily cited in critical theory even today. For that matter, one of Althusser's closest partners, Etienne Balibar, very frequently takes on issues of capital, race and gender from a structuralist perspective in new books he writes every year. Could the passage have been expressed in clearer terms? Maybe. But it's a mistake to charge it as not being able to tell what Butler is arguing.
As an aside, this same criticism is leveled against Hegel, but the most progressive thing you'll find in Hegel is his takedown of phrenology. Confusing language is not at all limited by ideology. On the other hand, there are very clear writers such as Marcuse and Althusser who form the bedrock of critical theory today. As Adorno wrote in response to a criticism of his literary style:
>"Now, from what you write about my language, to be honest, I find it very difficult to imagine that you mean it seriously. Your argumentation shows a true obsession with the thought of the reader. With my stuff you obviously didn't even come up with the idea that I'm not interested in him, neither in catching him, nor in snubbing him, but only in the most adequate and rigorous presentation of the matter possible. That is probably the only linguistic thing that can be done seriously against the cultural industry."
You say confusion, Adorno says rigor. I have a hard time seeing why I couldn't have substituted your Butler passage for a passage from a paper in recent abstract mathematics or type theory.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-unfortunate-f...
Stanford Philosophy provides a more detailed description of its history:
"It is reason which breeds pride and reflection which fortifies it; reason which turns man inward into himself; reason which separates him from everything which troubles or affects him. It is philosophy which isolates a man, and prompts him to say in secret at the sight of another suffering: 'Perish if you will; I am safe.'"
[0]http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Epistemology_Integrati...
1. That differences between individuals or groups of individuals is better explained by "nurture" rather than "nature."
2. That society is constructed in such a way that it benefits certain traits over others. Some benefits may be superficial- ex: whites are the most attractive. Others may be structural- ex: programmers make more than teachers because programming produces more value because capital is invested more in things that programming affects rather than things that teaching affects. This contributes to men making more money than women.
3. That it is possible to reconstruct society to avoid creating "nurture" originating differences between individuals and groups of individuals. Ex: Men are more likely to hit on women than women are to hit on men. Perhaps by teaching men to be less aggressive, this disparity will be avoided.
4. That society's structure is not a necessary development but rather an accidental one. Ex: America eats a lot of meat, but this only happened because the government subsidized corn, which made feed for cattle very cheap.
5. That society may be reconstructed in such a way that structural benefits are not present. Ex: Perhaps we should defund corn subsides and encourage people to eat bugs and plants rather than large animals?
6. That the reconstructed society will be "better." Better probably being less income inequality, more freedom, less violence, suffering, etc.
7. That when someone does something "wrong" in society, they may be "excused" since their behavior was nurtured, and they didn't know better. Additionally, since society is arbitrarily constructed, perhaps the "wrong" they committed is not an actual wrong. Ex: a student arrives late to class and receives a 0 for attendence. Perhaps this attendence should be excused because they come from a society where timeliness is not needed? Perhaps we should reconstruct society to make timeliness in class unnecessary?
8. That there is more than one right answer or truth. Ex: "Some physicists subscribe to the Many Worlds Theory. Others subscribe to the C[sic: I've forgotten the alternative] Iterpretation. Both can be right and there is no real need to reduce them down to a single correct answer."
While I certainly see how these individual things could be true, I don't see how any of these individual things are proven to be true. Further, while people seem to operate politically using these ideas under some grand unified model of progressivism, I don't see any evidence that the grand model will ever be realized.
'Let the experiment be made.' -- Benjamin Franklin
That is to say democracy is, or ought to be, at its essence all about discovering, through experience, which institutions best serve the common good. "Laboratories of democracy" is another phrase that comes to mind.
It's sad we have yet to find a way to run more than a single experiment