One of my SDR projects was to boot a GSM base station if my burglar alarm went off and store copies of every IMEI it can see in the cloud. Seems like it would be a better lead to hand investigators than a fuzzy security camera shot.
It would also need permission from the licensed spectrum holder, that could be harder to get.
But yes, completely legit with the right paperwork.
[1] The FCC has been pretty engaged in understanding the impacts of SDRs because of their potential for abuse (as one attendee called it, "The Drones of spectrum." As an amateur (AI6ZR) and someone in industry I've been helping as an SME to explain some of this stuff to their less technical staff.
I suppose we can sorta thank the FEC for their crazy broadcast device requirements when it comes to suspecting whether airplane mode actually stops a device from dialing home.
"Criminals deserve just as much privacy and safety as anyone else. If the government violates the criminal's rights to solve, prevent, or preempt crimes, even more crimes have occurred (privacy violations, killing of the criminal, etc.)
There should be explicit modes for phones and browsers available to criminals that allow them to safely commit crimes without risk of their rights being infringed upon."
Maybe "for the next hour, don't do the normal location-tracking/biometrics monitoring/reporting". I get that Google has no incentive to make that feature but maybe Apple does?
Trying to make a black and white distinction between criminals and everyone else is futile.
This. Drive 5mph over the limit? That's a crime. Buy some stuff off craigslist? I hope you paid sales tax on that, buddy.
Heh, are you a fed? ;)
>Google is tracking you. Even when you're in Airplane Mode without SIM card
> you should just not carry the tracking device in the first place
So I guess a Faraday cage would be the only sure way...
Also, cables coming outside of your box must be shielded too.
The Faraday cage would still leave the accelerometer fully functional. Now you might say "but because of drift it will rapidly diverge". Yes and no. It turns out that it's possible to detect based on "gestures" where you might be. Works better for winding irregular streets than in a gridlike street network.
If we go full Sherlock Holmes, the microphone might also overhear trains and music from stores giving away the location.
I could pretty easily verify my suspicions but I think others already have.
Still, it would be nice if the default for phones was to not be connected to the mobile network. Instead, they could listen out for a signal broadcast on an FM frequency (for example), and only connect to the mobile network when a specific unique ID was sent, indicating that you have an incoming call. (The unique ID would be agreed with the radio transmitter in secret before hand, and changed after each call).
When your phone is on a Wi-Fi network, it could instead have all incoming calls directed to it that way, like a softphone, meaning you would only rarely have to reveal your location to the mobile network.
The economics of this could work in some places (based on my rough guesses), but not if users had to root their phone to grant apps this permission to turn airplane mode on and off. I also don't know how much battery life would be required to be constantly processing an incoming FM signal in software (at least whenever the phone was off a Wi-Fi network). I'm also assuming that phones have FM receivers that apps can interact with, or that this could be an external device, connected via BlueTooth, perhaps.
As an example of the sort of society I am hoping to avoid, let me offer this article:
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/05/11/top_judge_mulls_com...
In all seriousness though, I'm pretty sure your system fails in the deliverability department.
Mobile phones are meant to be...well... mobile, and that functionality basically requires that when a call intended for you is started from somewhere else, there has to be a way for the signal to get correctly switched to where you are.
If you treat cell towers as switches, that then means that each tower maintains a routing table of handsets within it's area which allows the signal to eventually find it's way to you. This is the fundamental operating principle behind packet switching and the Internet in general.
Let's say there's 4 cells. A, B, C, and D.
I call you from A. You're in D's coverage area. A can connect to B and C, and C can connect to A, B, and D, B cannot see D.
My handset tells the switch behind cell tower A I'm looking for you. It checks it's routing table to see if it's serving you, and finds it can't, so it pings the next switch that has announced a possible route (C). C checks it's routing table, to find you and doesn't, but it sees D knows of you, so forwards to D. D knows you're there, so it finally connects the call. The circuit is made. This works because information about what handsets are in range, and which cell knows routes to what is constantly updated and propagated through the network. So if you took a trip out of D to B while on a call, the call would not have to terminate since the towers hand you off from tower to tower as your handset's location changes.
The system you propose though, breaks that paradigm. Since the cell tower has no way of tracking the handsets in its service area, every possible tower has to chirp to see if your phone will respond. Once your session is established, some of the normal routing protocols can still be reused, however, the initial connection stage is where it gets problematic.
Routing tables clean themselves up over time, so if you don't use your phone for long enough, you essentially cause the system to attempt a network-wide chirp just for you.
Now multiply that by everyone, times the timeout to voicemail, on every tower on the network. Not ideal. You have no way of telling whether the call connected with the handset until the handset actually answers, or every switch gives up and returns cannot connect as dialed. You're a walking DoS attack because someone wants to call you, and you won't pick up your damn phone.
Furthermore, your scheme degenerates to the current arrangement if an always available mobile data connection is assumed, as your phone will just establish a session every time it sends data.
Basically, it's not the telephone part that makes you traceable. It's the "I can guarantee synchronous delivery part". And hell, even if you throw out the mobile bit, phone records still the you to a location; it just takes a bit more footwork and a cooperative witness/wiretap to prove it's you.
It's a pretty in depth problem, with a lot of nuances to be squirreled out. It takes a long time to explain, and even if someone could get most of the way there, that's only the start of the issue. I've got friends who have tried making ISP's before, and the amount of friction created by monolithic telco's is absolutely insane even when you aren't doing anything exotic.
You have to remember as well, telephony isn't magic. You're eating up bandwidth all the time. Stuff is incredibly fast nowadays, but everyone is using it too. Also, all successful networking suffers from tracibility problems. Things just get mitigated slightly by jurisdictional boundaries and the impracticalities of being able to trace through sufficient levels of proxy links. So it's not surprising you got a few "you really don't get it" downvotes.
Anyway... Hope that explains things, and I'm sure there's a bunch of detail I'm missing.
EDIT: Additional thinking: there's other reasons why a telco/mobile provider would want all handsets connected at all times even when not doing calls. It gives them an idea of where they need to install or upgrade infrastructure based on metrics w.r.t how many handsets are in the cell.
Basically, from a business standpoint, there is little reason to not go the direction that we have. The privacy concern does change things a bit. Not sure whether it would be enough to drive a push to abandon/change things so drastically. It's an interesting thought experiment though that I will happily cogitate on for weeks in my idle time. I like devising new protocols.