Metzinger, Being No One (2004) may be just the step forward to which you refer. The prereflexive sense of self (as, say, a point-source of will and identity) is empirically inaccurate and faulty, and Metzinger attacks philosophy grounded in this untranscendable experience. But, unlike many philosophers, European or Buddhist, who satisfy to negate the ontological status of the self, Metzinger develops a theory of the self which is conceptually constrained by clinical medicine's empirical totality.

Two warnings about Metzinger, though: (1) a mood leaks through his writing, a sort of nihilistic determinism that his rigorous philosophy relentlessly evokes, but which his assertions do not imply; and (2) it is quite difficult reading, like a new Kant, lucid yet dense, requiring of a layman to assiduously infer and integrate the language of cognitive science.