The alternative is to ignore the problem.
Sensors go bad. Actuators go bad. Voting hardware goes bad. Message routing goes bad. Even the RAM sometimes goes bad.
When the hardware is failing ("specific streams of erroneous flight data") there isn't going to be a reliable solution. You can't even fully enumerate all the possible failures. How could you possibly guess that a message routing chip now flips bit 7 in every angle-of-attack measurement?
Boeing's answer is standard: when the values look crazy, stop doing stuff that might make the situation worse.
Because most of the time you can't. There is no reliable way of knowing when the sensor is lying to you.
You might try to reduce the probability of it happening and try to make it warn you (for example, redundancy, etc), but in aviation, even things that have a probability of failure of 10e-6 or even lower must be considered. 0% chance of reading an erroneous value doesn't exist.
The computer can deal with suspected erroneous input: it can ignore it. There. That's the standard way.
This might just be a bad case of people talking past one another.
If this is what we can expect going forward, the Jet Age isn't going to last another 50 years. This kind of software ought to be developed using a tool like TLA+.