Does this affect public cloud providers? Can it be used to obtain data from other VMs running on the same host?
AMD's SEV might help protecting VMs from each other.
Seems like mitigations for Rowhammer is not enough for RAMBleed.
The paper even specifically says that SEV and other similar technologies protect against this.
https://www.vusec.net/projects/eccploit/
tl;dr ECC logic can't cope with 'single' errors involving > 2 bits.
If these errors are actually treated as errors, then chips will be disabled or processes will get blacklisted long before they can be used to exploit.
So this is really "ECC is often configured wrong", not "ECC isn't effective".
There does seem to recently have been an increase in having HSMs be part of cloud offerings, and while that's a good idea in general issues like this may be part of it too. One issue with this attack is that even in research conditions it seems to be pretty fundamentally slow. It took them 34 hours to do the setup phase and another 4 hours of reading, all going after a few kilobytes (.31 bits/s, accuracy rate of 82%). Which could still matter a lot when it comes to cryptographic keys since those are all small, but it's not clear is or ever could be feasible for sniffing significant amounts of confidential content data. It's more that if credentials can be harvested that'd be the steppingstone towards taking over. So if keys are just plain moved to a minimal blackbox outside the system entirely and on which no customer code of any kind runs, that seems like a real mitigation to this particular leak? I mean, even beyond any basic improvements to DRAM (or successors to DRAM, I wonder how some of the NVDRAM research like future gens of Optane handle this?).