Going the other direction, monopolies leave the most money available for R&D. Japan famously leveraged the power of a small set of huge players—not monopolies, but very, very far from "perfect competition" markets, certainly—to drive post-WWII R&D, ensuring their continued success by delivering them a captive domestic market while pooling their excess funds with cooperation-encouraging incentives (=more money, from the government) to rapidly improve their tech and productive capabilities, aiming to become an export powerhouse. It worked.
This is not meant to be a defense of monopolies, especially those not firmly under the yoke of government to ensure all that excess is captured in some way for something resembling the public good, but the situation is more complex than one might first think, and whether one may prefer a huge number of market participants or a small number could be very much situational.
Regulated transmission prevents other providers from creating redundant infrastructure in a deregulated environment. Deregulation is possible not because of regulated infrastructure but in spite of it. I.e. Deregulation could still exist without regulated transmission but it was deemed to be in the public interest to reduce redundant infrastructure.
Incidentally, the 'public interest' has been one of the claims of moving to a deregulated market, with the thought that this would provide lower utility costs. However, this hasn't always worked out:
https://fuelfix.com/blog/2016/06/08/deregulated-texas-electr...