Hacker News Reader

> The A320neo and A320 have a common type rating too.

> Googling seems to suggest the differences are fairly minor however.

> I guess Airbus benefits in the A320 being a newer airframe than the 737 (which is ~50 years old now)?

The 737 is uniquely low to the ground among modern aircraft. (This was an advantage at airports without jetways high off the ground a long time ago.) Which means for every other model there’s plenty of space for new larger style engines under almost all of the existing planes. This makes airbus’s neo programs comparatively simple and reasonable for keeping the same type rating. The 737 doesn’t have the space, so they moved the engine location and came up with the MCAS as a workaround. It was clever, but unfortunately, too clever.

The truth of the matter is that the 737classic update from 1984 was already too low on the ground for the CFM56 engines to fit. So they had to reshape the nacelles into that odd shark mouth looking oval shape unique to 737s for that little extra bit of ground clearance. The problem isn’t new, was well known and yet greed made them update that same old airframe for 35 more years until it all came crashing down (literally, sadly)

Greed? The 737 is an excellent airframe. Suggesting that they kept the old airframe around because of greed is just silly.

Question: At what point does maintaining the 737 type rating become too much "technical debt"? Why not create a new (modern) type that fills the same commercial requirements as the 737?

I wish the FAA would grow some balls and come right out and declare the old 737 type rating as deprecated. No new designs (including the 737 MAX) are allowed to fall under it. The type is many decades outdated and increasingly poor decisions are being made to conform to it.

I'm wondering how other certification agencies will react.

Specifically after more and more of the incestuous relationship between the FAA and Boeing comes to light.

Including claims that experienced engineers, which were in charge for certain certifications were demoted or fired if they were too critical or outright refused to certify certain sub systems as was reported in the Seattle Times[1]

It seems that since 2004 engineers in charge of certification were stopped to communicate directly with techies at the FAA, but reported to their managers, which in turn communicated with the FAA.

He who pays the piper calls the tune.

[1] https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/engin...

Call your members of Congress and demand this.

Boeing was considering that. But were caught completely off-guard by the announcement of Airbus' 320NEO.

American Airlines (a life long Boeing customer) placing a massive order of 320NEO put Boeing into full throttle panic mode and triggered the unfortunate decision to apply yet a number of hacks to an airframe, which was not suitable for the purpose.

It seems we unfortunately found the answer to that question empirically.

> Question: At what point does maintaining the 737 type rating become too much "technical debt"?

I was about to snark, "Sometime prior to people dying as a result of the debt."

But then I considered that (potentially) the $X dollars saved by allowing the technical debt to live on, could probably be invested in some other way that saves far more lives. I.e., obesity reduction, smoking cessation programs, etc. So perhaps the issue isn't that simple.

> I really hope this ends in a court case or even better, a criminal case. I really want to know who signed off on this plan...

There are multiple lawsuits against Boeing going already, but don’t forget the FAA signed off on the plan, and some time ago formally adopted a policy of trust whatever the airlines say without checking carefully. Why even have a federal regulatory agency for air safety if they’re not going to independently scrutinize what the airlines do?

No 737s crashed in the US, so why would the FAA be on the hook for anything? Shouldn’t the civil aviation authorities in Ethiopia and Indonesia be the ones “in trouble?”

The FAA is supposed to catch problems before the crashes, not after them. It's pure luck that a 737 Max didn't crash in the US, that doesn't in any way absolve the FAA of it's charter and responsibility to check Boeing's activity and it's failure to assess the risk of the 737 Max. Our FAA did put US citizens at risk when it approved the 737 Max, so the FAA is on the hook absolutely.

Your point about Ethiopia's and Indonesia's agencies (and airlines) is reasonable, they ought to do their own due diligence on the aircraft that they use & allow on their turf. Smaller countries and agencies with fewer resources than us have tended to trust our FAA and the aircraft manufacturers to assess these risks. In that sense, the FAA's failure to regulate the Max and it's policy of outsourcing regulations to the manufacturers themselves is (rightly so) truly embarrassing for the FAA, is resulting in loss of trust of the US FAA globally, and maybe on the bright side is going to cause all other countries to start doing more of their own due diligence.

Free Trade is the answer. Most national civil aviation organisations defer to the aviation authority of the country where the manufacturer is based. So FAA is trusted/expected to maintain the standards for Boeing.

The last thing Boeing or Airbus wants is to have to prove their aircraft for every country in the world.

> It's the likes of American Airlines who has such a large and diverse fleet that really bet on the wrong horse.

American Airlines was going to place a major order with Airbus for the A320neo, Boeing promised AA that they will deliver a new aircraft quickly which will be better than A320neo if they cancel the A320neo order.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QytfYyHmxtc

If the airlines switch from 737 to A320neo then all the 737 pilots would have to be trained on the new plane which would cost the airlines big $$$

Southwest has ~10k pilots. At $20k type rating per pilot, that’s $200mil. An A320neo is $110mil. So, a big cost but not the biggest.

There are on-going costs of maintaining each type rating, so it isn't a one time cost. Also, you'd want most or perhaps all the pilots maintaining both type ratings, so they can still be matched with any 737.

Apparently, pilots can only be rated for one type at a time.

So during the cross-over period, you will need two completely independent fleets of pilots, one to operate the old 737s and one to operate the new A320-NEOs.

Each fleet needs to have different spare pilots to cover absences or overtime emergencies. And the pilots who currently are training for the new type rating can't be in either fleet.

The airline will have to temporally increase the number of pilots until the whole switch-over finishes.

> Apparently, pilots can only be rated for one type at a time.

You can have endorsements for multiple ratings but you will need to renew each independently, which costs. It would cost twice as much if you want to maintain two type ratings.

Interesting, if this is the case it would also have meant needing a second set of pilots for the MAX if it received a different rating.

It gets more complex.

Airbus have designed their A320, A330/A340/A350 planes with almost identical cockpits and handling characteristics to allow cross-crew qualification.

A pilot with an A320 type rating can take a 7 day course to become qualified on the A330 (instead of the 40 day course normally required). And they can maintain the type rating on both types simultaneously.

Since the A330 shares a type rating with the A340 and A350, this allows a pilot to fly quite a few airbus planes.

Given the Max is so close to older 737s, I see no reason why Boeing and the FAA couldn't come to a similar arrangement, were pilots can be cross-trained with a 1 week course and maintain simultaneous type ratings on both the Max and Older 737s.

Boeing does have a few common type ratings: The 757 and 767 share one; The 777 and 787 share another. But as far as I'm aware, pilots can only be qualified on one Boeing type rating at a time.

Given the Max is so close to older 737s, I see no reason why Boeing and the FAA couldn't come to a similar arrangement, were pilots can be cross-trained with a 1 week course and maintain simultaneous type ratings on both the Max and Older 737s.

Greed and hubris, would be my best guess.

Is it really possible for Boeing to fix this problem with out making changes that will require pilots to recertify anyway? If not then it seems like the training costs are a wash.

Add a third AoA sensor.

My understanding from what I’ve read elsewhere is that changing the AoA sensor from non-safety critical to safety critical is enough for it to be considered a new type of aircraft. This makes sense as you would expect pilots and crew to be trained on how to interpret all safety critical instruments.

If Boeing were to hire me to consult on this project, I'd suggest that they just go directly to five blades and/or make changes to instruments so they can be dialed to 11.

Sure, but the same goes for the 737 MAX-2 or whatever they call the eventual result of this, probably. I really doubt that they'll be able to continue to claim it's just another 737.

A320neo is also having issues. [1] Though the issues mostly have been related to a type of Pratt & Whitney engine, rather than the airframe.

[1] https://qz.com/india/1527728/india-places-checks-on-airbus-a...