"The Secret Service agent who questioned Ms. Zhang after her arrest, Samuel Ivanovich, said during testimony... [h]is four-and-a-half hour interrogation of Ms. Zhang was recorded by video... but it lacked sound because he didn’t realize that the agency’s office in Palm Beach didn’t have that capability." [0]
[0] https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/08/us/chinese-woman-mar-a-la... ¶12
The whole dimension of vulnerabilities and exploits, protocol flaws, trust boundaries, techniques for selecting or creating less vulnerable software, getting crypto implementation details right, principle of least privilege... none of that stuff even registers. I briefly worked in an IT consulting company that sold security and PCI compliance services; nobody was talking about any of that stuff. It was all password policies, antivirus products, phishing awareness campaigns.
The government definitely has real computer security engineering work happening in the NSA, NIST (FIPS 140-2 in particular is no joke), and other very high end defense-related areas. But I would not generally expect people using the word "cyber" to have a fighting chance against a nation-state-level evil USB stick.
>Mr. Alles was told to develop an exit plan before the arrest of a Chinese woman carrying a malware-laced device at Mar-a-Lago, exposing holes in the security of the private club.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/08/us/politics/randolph-alle...