Is this true ? There is no way I am hiring an Australian citizen then.
Source: Sydney Morning Herald https://www.smh.com.au/business/consumer-affairs/dangerous-o...
That would be a 5-year jail sentence apparently:
"The Australian government could demand web developers to deliver spyware and software developers to push malicious updates, all under the cloak of “national security.” The penalty for speaking about these government orders—which are called technical assistance requests (TAR), technical assistance notices (TAN), and technical capability notices (TCN)—is five years in prison."
Source: EFF https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/09/australian-government-...
I can’t see the government being able to defend itself. We elect the government to serve the people and the decisions of the government are negatively impacting the people no matter which way you spin it.
My 2cents.
It's 5 for not doing it and 5 for telling anyone, 10 for both
And there have to be limitations as to how far an individual could go as to subterfuge, so if your company enforces a 2-person code review and there aren't other authorized Australian nationals at hand, you could point at process preventing you from doing so without others' knowledge (how naive this defense is, I have no idea)
1. you take job at place with code review.
2. Australian police say place a backdoor.
3. You say we have code review the backdoor will be caught.
Now at this point the following might happen.
4a. make sure your code is reviewed by X. 4b. ok I guess it won't work. 4c. here is the code to put in, it has a very hard to catch bug that we can exploit.
in no way would I expect them to say 4d. well we're going to take you to court because you took a job that makes entering backdoors difficult.
on edit: improved formatting on 2nd edit: I removed the leading No but, because I can't remember why I started off with that.
Or even a reason? I mean, unless the backdoor has a hard-coded URL like `www.ThisIsAGovernmentBackdoor.gov.au`, then a backdoor wouldn't seem to automatically implicate the government. Then an employer might well assume that the employee is just doing their own hacking. And presumably the employee can't say otherwise, right?
Or does the law say that employees can refuse if they fear discovery? And if so, couldn't employees always just refuse on that basis?
If their purpose is to hack company X, are informed that the way they intend to do it will be discovered and expose the tool they were going to use, then I expect they would refrain from doing that and try to find some other way. If they do not refrain then their purpose must not be to hack company X but really just to expose the tool for some reason.
However if they just say I will likely be discovered because of this reason, the police will probably just say "that's a risk we're willing to take!" and go for it.
I suppose Australia can attempt to make a law saying any company based in Australia or selling products in Australia or with an internet presence available inside the country of Australia must stop using code review in case you ever hire an Australian citizen we want to put backdoors in your code.
Just imagining it is giving me quite the entertainment value.
> The Underhanded C Contest is an annual contest to write innocent-looking C code implementing malicious behavior. In this contest you must write C code that is as readable, clear, innocent and straightforward as possible, and yet it must fail to perform at its apparent function. To be more specific, it should perform some specific underhanded task that will not be detected by examining the source code.
Even knowing there is an exploit in the code, I probably would never be able to find most of them. My favorite is 2008's winner who's goal is to write a redaction program to redact text. It doesn't use any buffer/array hacks, the code is very straightforward and simple and small, and it would work in languages other than C. It's a terrifying example of how easy it is to write malicious code that would pass multiple code reviews but still has a backdoor!
Quit making me laugh, buddy. Unfortunately, I think we all know that once they get their office, they do very little to serve the people. Not sure about the case with Australia, but you can't sue the American government unless it lets you. Otherwise, it just claims sovereign immunity. Wrong as that is, it's a very good defense as it keeps them out of court. This might lead the employee to sue the employer ("I was complying with a lawful government order; you can't fire me for that!"), making Australians even more of a liability.
Employee gets fired for introducing a backdoor, but "may or may not have been" subject to one of these assistance notes (the Government won't comment either way, the employee insists they had a Technical Assistance Note). Employee sues the employer for wrongful dismissal because of the alleged unprovable TAN.
I wonder which way that court case would go... sounds like a recipe for deadlock.
But yes, it will be interesting to see how the courts rule. Not familiar with Australian law, so if anybody has thoughts about this, please feel free to enlighten me.
The govt can compell an entity to assist in making encrypted information available. But the entity in question is not the individual employee, but the company who owns the product or service.
If you're under the employment (i.e., not a contractor), you can't be an entity, and the employer will definitely know if they've been compelled.
But I do agree the law is stupid and erodes all trust from software owned by an Australian company.
https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/bi...
> 317C:
> For the purposes of this Part, the following table defines:
> (a) designated communications provider;
> (b) the eligible activitiesof a designated communications provider
> A person is a designated communications provider if...
... Actually, there's too many to list. But here are a few examples:
> - the person provides an electronic service that has one or more end-users in Australia
> - the person develops, supplies or updates software used, for use, or likely to be used, in connection with: (a) a listed carriage service; or (b) an electronic service that has one or more end-users in Australia
> - the person manufactures or supplies components for use, or likely to be used,in the manufacture of a facility for use, or likely to be used,in Australia
> - the person is a constitutional corporation who: (a) manufactures; or (b) supplies; or (c) installs; or (d) maintains; data processing devices
Note that in the last situation they specifically mention corporations, but that prior situations do not require this. The requirements listed are to be interpreted as an OR not and AND... so ah, that's fun.
So yes, we Australians can be legally required by our Government to perform corporate espionage... and almost no-one in Australia (certainly not the public at large) seems to give a f--k.
However, this legislation was specifically put together with co-operation of all members of the five eyes, so there's a reasonable possibility of extradition. The Department of Home Affairs even made a public statement confirming as much. It seems to have since been pulled from their website, but is available at:
https://cryptome.org/2018/11/5-Eyes-Crypto.pdf
Five Eyes just wanted this legislation pushed through somewhere and targeted Australia because we:
- lack a bill of rights
- are constantly distracted by politicians backstabbing each other, and
- there's a strong 'think of the children' sentiment in Australia that can be (and has been) used to push through all sorts of egregious bills.
If they could, then this would create a problem of national security for other countries.
But yes, the Five Eyes countries can use Australia for their wiretapping.
I read the PDF and didn't notice any mention of extradition. Am I missing something?
It also notes that this can be for economic espionage too and isn't limited to national security (for the people who like to pretend that's not what their intelligence agencies are doing)
This is why I simply wrote there's a reasonable possibility of extradition, rather than anything definite.
I don’t think this particular clause covers an individual working for a corporation as an employee, as in that case the employee isn’t providing the service the employer is.
It reads to me like that clause is intended to cover people who produce software as sole operators of their business, or perhaps a group of people in a business partnership.
I haven’t read the rest of the act, so maybe there is a stronger clause targeting employees?
If the government can compel a company to do a thing that doesn’t necessarily mean they can compel any particular individual.
You could refuse / quit / abandon the project. Maybe they’ll just find somebody else to do it?
Remember AU have no bill of rights.
> contracted service provider, in relation to a designated
> communications provider, means a person who performs services
> for or on behalf of the provider, but does not include a person who
> performs such services in the capacity of an employee of the
> provider.
The statute here is always talking about a contracted service provider who has to comply with the compelled "assistance". So as an employee, you do not have to worry about being jailed for non-compliance, as an employee cannot be a "contracted service provider". But you may be fired for non-compliance by your employer (if they choose to fire you because of it), but that's between you and your employer.
However, what I've quoted above is referring to the definition for a designated communications provider, as opposed to a 'contracted service provider' - the latter of which makes sense not to include employees as they're not 'contractors'. However, technical assistance notices (which are compulsory, as opposed to 'technical assistance requests') can be served to designated communications providers, as covered by 317L.
So the fact employees aren't considered a 'contracted service provider' is therefore not relevant?
Again, just reiterating, not at all a lawyer, however at this moment in time, this is my interpretation of the legislation.
I'm saying that if you are in the employ of a communications provider or a contracted service provider, you do not have to worry about being compelled directly. I take "the person" to mean an actual person, or a legal person, but the employee of the communications provider is not a person (IANAL, so don't use me as legal advice).
They don't understand the technology.
They don't listen to any of the people who advise them about this technology.
They seem only to be listening to the police and other law enforcement crying about "paedophiles and terrorists GOING DARK".
The Prime Minister at the time claimed the laws of Australia overrode the laws of mathematics. Seriously.
> 317ZG Designated communications provider must not be required
> to implement or build a systemic weakness or systemic
> vulnerability etc.
But the issue here is whether it's possible to perform the required "assistance" but not introduce systemic weakness or systemic vulnerability. I think it's a logical contradiction, so the law is pretty damn stupid...
> systemic vulnerability means a vulnerability that affects a whole class of technology, but does not include a vulnerability that is selectively introduced to one or more target technologies that are connected with a particular person. For this purpose, it is immaterial whether the person can be identified.
The words "systemic weakness" means something completely different to how the industry would use it.
This is now request that your lawyer would happily bill by the hour arguing with their lawyers in front of a judge - to determine whether it's a correct and enforceable interpretation of that shittily written legislation.
Except you aren't allowed to tell your lawyer we asked you to do it.
Politicians don't generally come home in the evening and sit down to write their own bills. They rely on "experts" to do it for them. The more we rely on a central regulatory apparatus, the more essential this is. And this is where we run into problem like this, as well as regulatory capture. But the fact remains that they've got to rely on somebody with expertise, yet where can you find such people, and how much can you trust them when they're not publicly responsible (or even known).
I also believe that these service provider(s) are required to not disclose the fact they've provided assistance. Therefore, apple would do well to not hire any australian company for their contracting purposes (but instead, employ them as an employee).
I less worried about an individual writing backdoor code and more worried about sabotage by giving private keys to government, leaking sensitive data etc. while these are not strictly backdoors in technical sense I guess government can put such things under that broad category.
Another question I have in my mind is whether it would be legal to post "Australian citizens may not apply for this job" under the job posting in USA. Clearly there is a good reason to believe an Australian citizen is not good enough for tech jobs given that he comes with this baggage.
* You make the change
* You report back that you made the change and it's now pending in code review
* Your change gets rejected in code review
* Australia tells you to make the change and circumvent code review
* You tell them you have no way to do that; every change goes through code review
* Australia wants to know who reviews your code, and if your code could be reviewed by an Australian
* Your boss asks you why you haven't delivered any changes recently and why are you constantly on the phone explaining the code review process
* Australia contacts a reviewer and tells them to accept your next change or else
* You get fired before you can submit the change again* You make the change.
* Your peer green lights the change because they have also been independently compelled by the government.
* You and your peer never talk about it again.
I'm not linking specific cases. (partially because you didn't specify which country you're taking any) A quick Google will bring you the specific laws, cases and lots of lawyers specifically advertising themselves to handle those cases.
It's up to the citizens and their government to rectify such poor legislation.
Extending your intelligence laws to cover individuals residing in other countries, who might also be citizens or permanent residents of those countries, can make for awkward dinner table discussion in diplomatic settings.
So hiring Australians working outside of Australia should be OK.
Of course, I'm not a lawyer. Or a spook. Or a diplomat.
2. In most countries you can't legally discriminate based on nationality. In practice publishing this comment here will likely cause you more trouble if you reject someone now, than Australian government.
3. If you apply this to all... what countries are you left with exactly where the government or LE can't force people to do something?
Yes you can, in some cases; as for instance in some cases, especially IT security, you cannot be a foreign national or have ties to some specific nationality if you do business with local governments. This requires you to know the nationality(ies) of your employees. You can still have them in your team but they cannot work on the project. The Australian law would make this a very good argument to not hire them as they cannot work on any project as they are a possibly compromised. An example would be SpaceX which only hires US citizens due to DoD contracts.
> 2. In most countries you can't legally discriminate based on nationality. In practice publishing this comment here will likely cause you more trouble if you reject someone now, than Australian government.
I'm pretty sure that in the cryptography and IT security business the value of not having to comply with this law outweighs the cost of any discrimination lawsuits.
I honestly don't know how SpaceX does what it does. (Update: they are regulated as working on military stuff so it's the same as DoD rules)
Even before this change plenty of Chinese nationals would likely be employed wherever they were storing data in Australia and MS didn't care about that. I'm not aware of any MS ban on hiring Chinese either. So they were presumably fine with the threat of Chinese nationals inserting back doors, but it's a problem now because it's Australians.
If someone sabotages a company after being instructed to do so by a Australian agency they are carrying out a lawful order.
Big difference IMO.
> Is this true ? There is no way I am hiring an Australian citizen then.
No. The request or notice is served to the company, not the individual, so the company is not left in the dark.
There has been a lot of poor reporting about this law; roughly speaking, there are 3 types of requests for data allowed:
1. Technical Assistance Request - "give me this data please". Optional, no penalty to anyone for not complying.
2. Technical Assistance Notice - "give me this data if you can, or else..". Mandatory, penalty to the company if they can comply but do not comply.. but if the company would have to build a new thing to comply (e.g. they do not have the decryption key and there's no backdoor), then there's no penalty and they do not have to comply.
3. Technical Capability Notice - "give me this data or build a way to give me this data, or else..". Mandatory, and a penalty to the company if they do not comply. If they can't do the thing yet, they need to build a backdoor, unless doing so would introduce a "systemic weakness".
In all cases, it's the company being targeted. Individuals in the company only become liable for penalties if they leak information to people not involved in the investigation.
Yes, it's still a bad law that was rushed through with too little discussion. Yes, there is too much room for interpretation and too little oversight. (And yes, Australian tech companies like Atlassian are lobbying heavily to improve the situation[0][1][2].)
But we're not at the point where it's reasonable to blacklist Australian tech workers yet, thankfully.
Source: I am an engineering manager at Atlassian, a major Australian tech company; there has been a lot of internal discussion and guidance from our founders and legal team about this.
Disclaimer: I am not a lawyer, this is not legal advice, etc. Also, I am an Australian citizen.
[0]: https://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/technology/scott-f...
[1]: https://www.afr.com/technology/web/security/atlassian-leads-...
[2]: https://ia.acs.org.au/article/2019/tech-industry--fix-the-as...