A predestined correction is still a correction though. Unless you assume "correction" to have some bizarre and probably incoherent non-deterministic meaning. In context, "correction" means "learning to choosing correctly as opposed to incorrectly", which is precisely what happens in this scenario.
> However, choosing limited definitions, and restricting ourselves in comfortable contexts we can certainly avoid discomfort of the thought.
I dispute this characterization. It's not "limited definitions" and "comfortable contexts" (presumably pejoratively), it's "appropriate definitions" and "relevant contexts".
> but I see clearly why non-compatibilists say "word juggling" towards compatibilists.
I think you'll find that the incompatibilists are just as guilty of this. They've spent centuries arguing for a definition of free will that no one actually holds. Philosophy is sometimes about drawing fine but relevant distinctions, and that's exactly what Compatibilism does: it carves out a fine line behind which we can make sense of holding intelligent learning agents responsible for their choices.