Comment by poof131 | Hacker News Reader

Comment by poof131 | Hacker News Reader

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If this accident is a second trim related incident due to their MCAS system, it is damn near criminal negligence at this point and they probably need to ground the fleet. From an earlier article, pulling back on the yoke would disable the system.[1] They removed that functionality. Not easy to teach people new habits or proper procedures when the intuitive solution worked. And if the intuitive solution worked is that not really the proper procedure despite what engineers on the ground think.

If MCAS is the culprit here, Boeing clearly released this functionality without proper vetting and testing. It’s a sad day for safety and for automation. These accidents will likely slow the advance of BVR for drones[2] and more autonomous flight for cargo.[3] The fact these accidents are occurring overseas where the pilots have less training will also buttress the decision for the 1500 hour rule.[4] Like I said, if MCAS is suspected here, probably time to ground the new 737 despite what it will do to Boeing, because right now it looks like they cut some corners, the FAA let them, and families are mourning. Pilot error isn’t really the issue, it’s engineering, process, and training.

[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19077371

[2] https://www.altiuas.com/bvlos-mean-commercial-drone-users/

[3] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-10/will-you-...

[4] https://www.forbes.com/sites/marisagarcia/2018/07/27/a-perfe...

> If MCAS is the culprit here, Boeing clearly released this functionality without proper vetting and testing

From what I read MCAS is not even a true safety system, much more like a piloting assist, and should not have had the authority to override pilot input.

It appears that the true stall avoidance system is a "hard" safety system and works independently with much safeguards, and a lot of "overrideability" just for such moments of sensor failure.

So, they added that dangerous system to just let pilots to have the same feel and experience as in old model - an absolutely noncritical issue.

Truly, "UX" people...

One note: the pilot here was a senior pilot with 8k+ hours.

Doesn't this mean he/she was more used to the old functionality, which didn't work and perhaps hadn't been sufficiently retrained on the new operating procedure?

Boeing's shenanigans are the reason retraining isn't "required", though it does appear to actually have been necessary.

I think training was given after Lion Air, though I agree it wasn't given before then and should have been.

BTW "they" is a gender-neutral pronoun that has been used as a singular pronoun for over 600 years (longer than singular "you"), is less awkward than "he/she", and is inclusive of non-binary people.

So if the cause is what the parent comment suggests that just adds weight to the notion that it's a stupid procedure. I'm in favor of waiting for the final report before getting all agitated.

>because right now it looks like they cut some corners, the FAA let them, and families are mourning. Pilot error isn’t really the issue, it’s engineering, process, and training.

That doesn’t seem like engineering, process, nor training.

That looks like something connected to large scale corporate profit.

How did Boeing manage to gain self reporting to the FAA?

Boeing deserves to be sued into oblivion for this, if it turns out to be something related to Lion Air. It’s a horrible feature and they are being obstinate about it simply because they are afraid of liability. Meanwhile hundreds have died already.

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