Comment by unionemployee | Hacker News Reader

Comment by unionemployee | Hacker News Reader

In response to future 'trim system/AOA sensor' comments: Transport aircraft have a procedure to cut out a runaway/malfunctioning trim or stick pusher. Usually, this procedure is to press and hold the autopilot disconnect button on the yoke/stick or the trim switch and then, later, deactivate the system. The pressing of the autopilot disconnect button or trim switch is a 'memory item', meaning that it should be performed immediately, without a checklist, upon recognizing that there's a problem. Previously, this malfunction has been a rare occurrence, and so can be startling to pilots or not immediately recognized. I've seen pilots fail to apply the procedure and crash many times in the simulator, even after being told it was coming. It could be said that the pilots of the Lion Air aircraft and, potentially, this Ethiopian aircraft should have known the procedure and reacted properly, however, for Boeing to put them in this situation is, in my opinion, also quite hazardous. With so many hastily trained and low-competence airline pilots flying around, should we really rely on them to understand the technology and react properly?

If this accident is a second trim related incident due to their MCAS system, it is damn near criminal negligence at this point and they probably need to ground the fleet. From an earlier article, pulling back on the yoke would disable the system.[1] They removed that functionality. Not easy to teach people new habits or proper procedures when the intuitive solution worked. And if the intuitive solution worked is that not really the proper procedure despite what engineers on the ground think.

If MCAS is the culprit here, Boeing clearly released this functionality without proper vetting and testing. It’s a sad day for safety and for automation. These accidents will likely slow the advance of BVR for drones[2] and more autonomous flight for cargo.[3] The fact these accidents are occurring overseas where the pilots have less training will also buttress the decision for the 1500 hour rule.[4] Like I said, if MCAS is suspected here, probably time to ground the new 737 despite what it will do to Boeing, because right now it looks like they cut some corners, the FAA let them, and families are mourning. Pilot error isn’t really the issue, it’s engineering, process, and training.

[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19077371

[2] https://www.altiuas.com/bvlos-mean-commercial-drone-users/

[3] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-10/will-you-...

[4] https://www.forbes.com/sites/marisagarcia/2018/07/27/a-perfe...

One note: the pilot here was a senior pilot with 8k+ hours.

Doesn't this mean he/she was more used to the old functionality, which didn't work and perhaps hadn't been sufficiently retrained on the new operating procedure?

Boeing's shenanigans are the reason retraining isn't "required", though it does appear to actually have been necessary.

I think training was given after Lion Air, though I agree it wasn't given before then and should have been.

BTW "they" is a gender-neutral pronoun that has been used as a singular pronoun for over 600 years (longer than singular "you"), is less awkward than "he/she", and is inclusive of non-binary people.

So if the cause is what the parent comment suggests that just adds weight to the notion that it's a stupid procedure. I'm in favor of waiting for the final report before getting all agitated.

>because right now it looks like they cut some corners, the FAA let them, and families are mourning. Pilot error isn’t really the issue, it’s engineering, process, and training.

That doesn’t seem like engineering, process, nor training.

That looks like something connected to large scale corporate profit.

How did Boeing manage to gain self reporting to the FAA?

> If MCAS is the culprit here, Boeing clearly released this functionality without proper vetting and testing

From what I read MCAS is not even a true safety system, much more like a piloting assist, and should not have had the authority to override pilot input.

It appears that the true stall avoidance system is a "hard" safety system and works independently with much safeguards, and a lot of "overrideability" just for such moments of sensor failure.

So, they added that dangerous system to just let pilots to have the same feel and experience as in old model - an absolutely noncritical issue.

Truly, "UX" people...

Boeing deserves to be sued into oblivion for this, if it turns out to be something related to Lion Air. It’s a horrible feature and they are being obstinate about it simply because they are afraid of liability. Meanwhile hundreds have died already.

> for Boeing to put them in this situation is, in my opinion, also quite hazardous

I'm sure this is an edge case given all of the successful 737 MAX 8 fights, but it's a catastrophic one.

To go from smooth flying conditions to having the nose unexpectedly dive and having seconds to save your life and everyone on board is almost more dangerous than difficult flying conditions because it's so unexpected.

I'd be surprised if Boeing continues to treat this as a training issue. The plane needs to be better.

I'm sure this is an edge case given all of the successful 737 MAX 8 fights

There are 350 737Max in service. It's a brand new airplane - it went into service in mid-2017.

For 2 brand new (months old) 737Max to fall out of the sky is not an "edge case".

This. They should be taken out of service and seriously investigated now at this point.

And Boeing’s procedures on how it disseminates information should be held under a microscope and punished severely.

Right, but how many successful test flights and real world flights where this never happened?

2 accidents is 2 too many, but it's not like every MAX 8 or anywhere close to the majority or even a large minority are experiencing catastrophic failure.

Sure, it's far higher than what's acceptable and the industry norm, but I'd imagine it's enough of an edge case that it snuck past testing and 99%+ of real world flights.

Or should we not have hastily trained low-competence pilots flying around?

I don't think that's avoidable. The demand is too high right now. Personally, I'd like to see increased automation and "low-pilot" aircraft enter service.

Note that we have decades of experience and skill at easily teaching basic stick and rudder flying skills, however deploying independent systems/automation analysts under emergency conditions is highly problematic and will likely result in more tragedies.

I'm just saying its simpler, cheaper, and safer to deploy people who can troubleshoot simple flying systems rather than to deploy people who will have to debug untested and complicated automation systems on the fly. It would be the most extreme field service posting, ever.

What we have here is an over optimization problem; we "have to" build unflyable aircraft to keep up with everyone elses level of recklessness to squeeze a couple more hyper-financialized pennies out of the system or be replaced by someone reckless enough to do it. Traditionally regulation helps in these situations. The aircraft of the future is far more likely to have networking and interconnected processors prohibited by law for safety reasons than to be an internet of things self-flying appliance. That would result in a nice simple, admittedly lower performance, far more reliable overall system. Non-networked non-interconnected control microprocessors seem safe enough so far, but making an infinitely complicated hyper optimized system seems in practice to result in planes falling out of the sky too often.

You could make the same faulty argument to obviate the need for all safety features on everything. Safety is about defense in depth. Ideally we'd have all planes flown by perfect platonic human pilots, but such a thing does not actually exist. All people are flawed (some more than others), and we should design technology to be resilient in the face of the inevitable human failings to the fullest extent possible, especially when lives are on the line. Boeing has simply failed to do so here.

> Ideally we'd have all planes flown by perfect platonic human pilots, but such a thing does not actually exist.

Until we teach spherical cows to fly planes, that is...

You could make this argument for a toaster or a word processor. If you’re talking about a flying vehicle carrying 158 people it’s no more than a poor excuse. The pilots ought to be competent and properly trained and only then you can start blaming the equipment.

The pilot on this plane appears to have been expert, flying for the airline for around a decade.

https://xkcd.com/293/

The pilot had 8k+ hours of flight.

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