> All of the ways it's unlike Pearl Harbor favor the Chinese over what the Japanese had to work with in WWII. For one thing, they already control China. For another thing, they wouldn't have to reach all the way to Hawaii. They could mount pressure requiring a US response, then take out our carrier groups relatively close to their shores.
While true, I was referring more to the idea that immediately destroying a significant amount of American naval power would cause the United States to immediately fold. In that respect, China's possession of nuclear weapons is the most relevant difference.
On the other hand, China would get one shot at 2, maybe 3 carrier groups. If their attack fails, it would be a massive strategic backfire. If their attack succeeds, they gain only the immediate operational advantage of not having to worry about US carrier groups. They would also gain the strategic advantage of tying the hands of the US in terms of deploying ballistic missile defenses against a potential Chinese nuclear strike. But, as you point out, we could adapt and deploy submarines to blockade China while exerting diplomatic and economic pressure.
In other words, even if China manages to prove themselves invulnerable to the projected power of American carriers, they would still not gain a sustainable advantage and would remain in a protracted state of hostilities. The best case outcome of a Chinese first strike against American carriers would still be pretty awful for them.
> Even directed energy weapons have a saturation point. Such weapons are also dependent on detection and targeting, which can also be jammed and saturated.
It's hard to say at this point. If you're discussing the claim that cruise missiles are cheaper than carriers, a fair response is that megawatts are cheaper than cruise missiles. Maybe it won't work out, but it's worth a try and that's the stage we're at.