> It's plain, zero-sum rent-seeking.
It is zero-sum iff the benefit to Oracle is exactly equal to the deadweight loss imposed by the tax.
I tried to calculate this in the simplest econ 101 way, and got a surprising result. I would appreciate someone else commenting...
Assume that the schedule of supply and the schedule of demand are straight lines. We have three groups: (1) purchasers of phones; (2) vendors of phones; (3) Oracle.
In the absence of a tax imposed by Oracle, an equilibrium quantity Q_e of phones trade at an equilibrium price P_e. [1] This generates gains from trade, producer and consumer surplus, equal to the area circumscribed by the schedule of supply, the schedule of demand, and the line Q = 0.
When Oracle imposes a fee on phone sales of value F, the price and quantity-traded of phones adjust. The new quantity traded Q_f is lower than Q_e, and the new price P_f is higher than P_e. The gains from trade are now the trapezoid circumscribed by the line Q = 0, the line Q = Q_f, the supply schedule, and the demand schedule. The missing gains, the deadweight loss, are equal to the triangle circumscribed by the line Q = Q_f, the supply schedule, and the demand schedule.
Oracle receives F×Q_f in fees, a benefit equal to F×Q_f.
The deadweight loss is a triangle with base F and height (Q_e - Q_f). It is therefore equal to (F×Q_e - F×Q_f)/2.
Balancing the gains to Oracle against the deadweight loss, we see that they are equal when Q_f is one third of Q_e, or in other words when the fee is so massive that it cuts the quantity traded by 66%. If Q_f is larger than that, the benefits to Oracle exceed the loss imposed on purchasers and vendors.
This result would seem to imply that we could improve the efficiency of the marketplace by allowing random third parties to impose large taxes on pretty much any good. This is hard to believe. Where did I go wrong?
[1] In reality, there are a variety of models available at a variety of price points. This doesn't affect the problem I have with my result, though it is probably relevant to the phone market in specific.