Makes me think I need a better strategy on the username side to not leak that info.
Makes me think I need a better strategy on the username side to not leak that info.
- if they start sending you spam you can severe their capacity to contact you by deleting the alias
- if they give your contact to a third party, you know from the alias who leaked your email address
- if you see an email on a data breach like this one, you know immediately which website got hacked
- it makes it really hard to correlate your identity across two websites
Even if the dictionary and patterns are known by an attacker, this still has very good entropy on ~16 characters long sentences. For usernames you can easily just go down to the minimum (around 6-10).
I find this superior to random values in a lot of places as it's easily readable and it's also easily typeable, when copy-paste doesn't work.
[1] https://bitbucket.org/ligos/readablepassphrasegenerator/wiki...
How does that follow? It still adds value to use aliases that identify the site where they're used, because then you don't need to do a hashtable lookup to see where your mail is coming from.
What I and many others do is reuse not a password, but reuse a password formula (in my case with slight but easily memorable variations depending on importance, or if forced by stupid password rules). If you saw a dozen of my email/password combinations in the clear you would be able to reverse engineer the rules and then guess combinations for arbitrary sites almost as good as me. It's a calculated risk, just like trusting a password manager is a calculated risk. Right now I consider password managers the better trade-off, but still only slightly better, by a margin small enough to make it not worthwhile to invest in a habit change. If the "formula" I happen to use was just a little harder to reverse engineer than it sadly is I would consider it strictly safer than password managers.