> As you say: agencies, not agency
This seems to willfully ignore the immense degree of cooperation between Five Eyes, Nine Eyes, SSEUR, etc. It's hard to get real numbers, but I think one would be safe in making the assumption that spending of Five Eyes + friendlies absolutely dwarves any other intelligence expenditure. So call it "the NSA" or whatever, but we are referring to the giant, interconnected "Western Intelligence" supra-national agency whose capabilities were considered to be the stuff of science fiction before the Snowden leaks.
> The remaining problem is statistical correlation, where studies show it is actually not trivial to perform and takes time and repetitive behavior.
You are disingenuously shrinking the problem space here, by pretending that Tor is somehow bug free, or that all known bugs and flaws are already known. This is vanishingly unlikely. The question is not "are there exploitable bugs in Tor", but "how many zero-days do these organizations have?"
Further you hand-wave away a well-known problem by saying it's "not trivial to perform". You're talking here about an organization that literally taps underwater cables with specialized submarines, and arguably scans and extracts metadata from virtually _ALL INTERNET TRAFFIC_.
The parent said:
>> "I’m confident the government can demask users on demand as needed."
which you then attempted to reduce to the absurd by saying:
> Your argument also assumes that everyone is immediately fucked when one powerful adversary can break the anonymity
Which is a bizarre reading.
> feel free to check the largest non-exits in terms of capacity, and investigate the motives. It's all public information.
Other people's motives are "public information"? Lulz.