Interesting to see how well most of these have stood the test of time or have even become more forceful because of it (17 for instance).
Wonder how the writer would have written these today, what would be changed, left out or added.
Wonder how the writer would have written these today, what would be changed, left out or added.
I think another big difference and a subject that probably would be included in a redo is understanding how all of the modern data generating systems can reveal covert activity through the analysis of metadata and how to "hide in the noise" of this.
The geospatial correlation of burner phone to actual identity if one does not practice good sanitation as far as locational security when accessing wireless networks as an example.
I think one way to circumvent this is to force all participants to keep the cellphones in their offices/homes, and then meet elsewhere at a predetermined time, with no one carrying phones.
As many security professionals often say, it's not about whether I do any illegal activity, it is also about whether someone can "impersonate" me for various crimes like phishing. The less sensitive information people know about you, the safer it is for you.
The field people in HUMINT are called "case officers". Their job is to recruit and manage spies, not spy themselves. It's a strange combination of sales, human resources, and counseling. Dulles was from that world.
The big difference today is that the targets are smaller.
Back in the Cold War era, I worked for a company that built stuff for the three-letter agencies. They were all focused on the USSR; anything else was almost a spare time activity. It was a huge culture shock to the intelligence community when the USSR went down. First there was a big downsizing in intel. Then all the little players who had been squelched by the superpowers started asserting themselves, and the US intel community struggled to figure out what to do. The agencies had the wrong expertise and capabilities. And the wrong speed. The USSR was a very slow moving opponent. The little players moved much faster.
During the Cold War, huge efforts were put into finding out very general things about what the Soviet Union was doing - how many bombers, how many missiles, where the air bases were. Big attack surface. Today, it's trying to find some tiny terrorist group and getting someone to talk.
The OPM hack highlighted how opponents will attack weakest points such as the database of background check data. Now supposedly the Chinese know the detailed backgrounds, the secrets, even biometrics of millions of US agents.
The Russian passport database was leaked, which allow independent investigators to track down and prove that the Skripal assassins were GRU officers. It was based on special markings in the database and the sequential passport numbers:
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2018/10/09/ful...
It was further confirmed by researches looking through tons of photos posted on the wall of Russian military academies to find Chepiga - one of the assassins:
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2018/10/02/ana...
What's interesting here is that the exposure is not only to other state actors (who will presumably keep it secret) but also to these independent researchers, and leakers (Snowden), who don't mind laying it out for the whole world to see.
And frankly, there still are places where a phone book is still in use.