It is difficult to believe that there is no backdoor.
It is difficult to believe that there is no backdoor.
DDR3&4 is a good example of this where the CPU scrambles[0] what is written to physical memory to get the data closer to 50/50 1s and 0s.
In this case I doubt this is the primary reason though.
[0]: https://web.eecs.umich.edu/~taustin/papers/HPCA17-coldboot.p...
Here's an open source controller - you can see yourself: https://github.com/enjoy-digital/litedram
1. Protecting their trade secrets. Even if it's eventually leaked or copied, the time between introducing the product and a clone happening might represent billions in sales.
2. Reducing patent damages. Hardware is a patent minefield with suits and licensing deals pretty common. The companies that want to troll need to see clearly that their patents were infringed. Making the product as opaque as possible reduces the number that will notice in the first place and/or how certain their claim will look. Patent suits are the single, greatest threat to open-source, hardware companies that operate in an existing ecosystem.
i.e. it may reduce the total sum of patent damages across all potential cases by reducing the number that result in litigation, while increasing likelihood of increased damages for an unsuccessful defense.
Can't help but think 2. really seems to me a double edged sword.
So, without even getting into the whole DRM argument, yes?
From the user, since SGX is also used/intended for DRM purposes.
This doesn't mean it isn't a deterrent, but doing things in an obfuscated and unusual way also means you're potentially treading on unexplored ground, and so there will potentially be other exploits, bugs, innefficiencies which can come with the territory.
You might have a point if someone had ever made a perfect scheme, but everything that seems to have attracted attention has been broken AFAICT.
So, a moat around a castle does help. Calling it good after digging a moat and not building any walls is probably less useful than doing nothing. The moat is only useful in the broader context.
I worked for a thin client vendor years ago that was obsessed with encrypting our boot image etc, and poured all our resources into that. Which lead to encryption that was still trivial to work around, and a lot of other real security issues were never dealt with because we were fixated on the ineffective obscurity layer.
It also made our images more insecure, because it added no real security, while making it harder to improve security where it mattered.
In general, to protect the hardware IP. ME and FSP both do a lot of low level stuff that is instrumental to the silicon working in the first place.