The part that grandparent is quoting starts at about 38 minutes in.
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/08/oracl...
This kind of attitude goes all the way back to 2002 https://www.theregister.co.uk/2002/01/16/oracle_security_cla...
But that's about it.
> While the crashing bug was reported to the VirtualBox tracker (https://www.virtualbox.org/ticket/16444), it was never considered a security vulnerability, and is not marked as one. This ticket is 15 months old at the time of writing this post and still marked as unresolved.
They might not be The Worst, but at 15 months, they're not great.
Very, very rarely will a Sev1 crash in production software be instantly reproducible. When it is, it’s an utter embarrassment. More often the full set of conditions which lead to the crash are unknown, rare, and hard to fully quantify all at once.
And yet, we know with certainty that the crash did happen and by definition it is a valid bug in any sane world where “don’t crash” is an absolute requirement.
Any crashing bug in a hypervisor must be assumed to be security critical until proven otherwise. Even after “proving” a crash can’t possibly be exploited, you should still assume that a clever attacker will figure out a way. The Venn diagram of “crashing bugs” and “security exploits” is vanishingly disjoint.
If you absolutely can't crash, you need to build an OS that caters to that - modern OSes explicitly prioritize other goals, like performance
Because, they plainly don't hide it and try to be nice, at least.
I also think that they're the worst in the industry.
My personal bias would also tell me Oracle is because of their business practices, but we were arguing about support practices.
My perceived worst definition was not about only business practices BTW. I meant in every category.
Nonetheless, supporting the products you sold are also a business. :)