Of course, you should always be able to disable this sort of collection.
Of course, you should always be able to disable this sort of collection.
I'll happily enable certain kinds of data collection when a tool is transparent and it makes its data collection opt-in.
Usage analysis is different, and should be opt-in.
How do you intend to tell the difference between Atom's and VSCode's Git(hub) integration, app updater, package manager, telemetrics or an exploitation? The difference between a Signal, WhatsApp or Telegrams' messages and their telemetrics?
Your proposed heuristic only works for applications that would not otherwise have any network traffic, and even then, only if you do on-machine per-process network monitoring. Once it has any valid traffic what-so-ever (which is the case for basically any modern GUI application), then you quickly descend into needing to disassemble binaries locate the cause.
Opt-in vs. opt-out is about privacy and rights, not about security. Malicious companies whose traffic are a security breach and things down those lines are problems that belong in an entirely different discussion, whose root-cause is much deeper than opt-in vs. opt-out.
Also, regarding scrubbing: A stack-trace and error message is far from private identifying information. No harm done in sharing it.
If I select a git command from a GUI, that's an explicit request by the user.
>app updater, package manager
If something legitimately requires background network activity, and security updates might qualify, it should go in Crontab. The system should have exactly one package manager, and apps should not re-implement their own.
>telemetrics
If I turn it on, I'll remember I turned it on.
Otherwise, on the network, git fetch and telemetrics to github will be indistinguishable (except if you start doing opaque data pattern analysis). There's also no automatic correlation on the network.
On the machine itself, the closes you could get is something like Little Snitch, which still won't be able to help at all, as permitting Atom to speak to Github on port 443 will permit everything while disallowing will block everything, and it's also designed to be a manually populated whitelist, rather than a constant authorization system.
> If something legitimately requires background network activity, and security updates might qualify, it should go in Crontab. The system should have exactly one package manager, and apps should not re-implement their own.
First of all, eww. Nothing is worse than updates running on a crontab, causing shit to break because it updated automatically.
Also, welcome to 2018. Everything outside Linux bundle their own updater, and on Linux, flatpak and other newfangled things bypass most package managers (even with dnf's flatpak integration, it's still not going through any yum repos).