Tangential, but the author’s description of Kuhn’s paradigms as describing things incommensurably differently (“claims that were true in the old way of talking might be false in the new way, and vice versa”) reminds me of the way Hofstadter summarises Gödel’s incompleteness thereoms in GEB. That is that no set of axioms can be both mathematically complete and consistent, so we may need multiple theories (paradigms?) to reason effectively and discover all truths.
Morris seems to claim (based on the author’s summary) that necessary a posteriori truths (ala Kripke) provide some sort of anchor across these paradigms that proves newer paradigms are better than older ones because (and I’m a little unsure on his argument) newer theories are still describing the same thing in different detail and we can therefore see that a newer paradigm is objectively richer and more truthful.
However, I wonder as Kuhn did whether this argument is strong enough to handle all scenarios. As Kuhn argued, a concept of Heat is substantially different across paradigms. I would add to the list those qualitative problems like consciousness and qualia that seem, at least at this stage, to require non-scientific paradigms (ala Lyotard) to reason meaningfully about, but in taking on these paradigms we lose the ability, as Kuhn argued, to talk meaningfully about things we could previously.