My recollection when reading Structure of Scientific Revolutions was that toward the very end of the book he gets into some more traditional philosophy in relation to incommensurability, which centers around the technical impossibility of comparing paradigms and drawing metaphysical conclusions from that. But for most of the book he speaks very practically about making comparisons and talks about various measures that can be used to evaluate the efficacy of competing paradigms (e.g. accuracy with which theoretical claims match experimental measures, and number of claims which can be verified experimentally).
The article talks about a frustration of Kuhn's where "... Kuhn felt his critics disagreed not with his actual views but with distortions of his views — with the views of a fictional Kuhn." That has certainly been my experience in coming across discussions of Kuhn after reading Structure of Scientific Revolutions: "huh? Did we read the same book?" Most all of what he says is pretty common sensical, practical, illuminating and informed by history—but it seems that folks aren't interested in that and would prefer to ignore 95% of the book and respond to his concluding philosophical synthesis (which I mostly dismissed as an insignificant somewhat egotistical decoration tacked on to the book).
This bit from the article neatly clarifies the whole issue, IMO:
> The issue here is not the denial of reality, but the denial of an absolutely preferred way of talking about it. Statements can be true or false, but not whole languages. As Kuhn puts it, “The ways of being-in-the-world which a lexicon provides are not candidates for true/false.”