Also WASM remains to be battle tested regarding exploits in the wild.
Also WASM remains to be battle tested regarding exploits in the wild.
The difficulty of full safety verification on the JVM is well studied [2]. The security-focused Joe-E language actually decompiles JVM bytecodes back to Java to avoid the many full abstraction failures that have been documented.
The CLR is a little better on the safety record, but the verification costs can be even higher because the CLR supports various pointer types. Proper verification requires control-flow analysis, but instead they partition the bytecode into safe/unsafe variants and only the safe variant is "verifiable". IIRC, WASM doesn't have this limitation.
[1] https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~caw77/papers/mechanising-and-verif...
[2] http://www-master.ufr-info-p6.jussieu.fr/2005/IMG/pdf/leroy-...
As for the links I will check them later. Thanks providing them.
WASM still needs to prove itself in similar scenarios.
"Fine-tuning security" is typically symptomatic of bad security design. Security is not a separable concern.
I will read the paper later on.