Sage advice. Right until the day that there is a major exploit of a popular password manager.
Sage advice. Right until the day that there is a major exploit of a popular password manager.
It's certainly not impossible that some major flaw will eventually be found in KeePass, but it's stood the test of time so far, and it's hard to imagine how it could be mass exploited considering it basically just reads and writes a local AES-encrypted file. Even if someone finds something that lets you completely bypass the encryption (which is very unlikely), they'd still need to gain access to your hard drive (or wherever you're storing the file).
But I'd also say the net security benefit of a lot more people using something like LastPass or 1Password would still outweigh the damage of a future vulnerability.
Either way, there is really no excuse for password reuse in 2018, especially when your password for managing your super popular software package running on an enormous amount of devices is the same as the password to your Harry Potter fanfic forum account or whatever.
one thing that is without dispute is that a password manager will not reuse or slightly vary the same password which is what human beings pretty much always do.
also some popular ones have integrations for reissuing credentials for major sites. in theory if there were some huge compromise you change your master key and reissue as many pw automatically as possible. then focus on the ones in the list that you know have your credit card saved or are essential for other reasons (npm credentials). you also literally have a list to go down at the point anyway. what is the alternative scenario if your 'same password everywhere' pw is compromised ... try to remember which websites you use and might be the biggest issue and literally manually change every single one?
But at least, in the event of an exploit, the VM is still without networking.
You conveniently forgot about the MFA part. The attacker will still need the other factor.
Some code somewhere needs to be able to decrypt all those stored encrypted passwords - that code is a _super_ high value target.
I like/use/recommend/have-paid-for 1Password for 5-6 years now - but I worry that the online and 1Password for Teams implementation - even though I trust the 1Password team to "get it right" - has got to be a really "fun" target for sufficiently motivated and resourced attackers. (If I were sitting round at the NSA looking for a fun project - automated MITM of 1Password traffic at p0wned or backdoored-by-agreement carrier or IX routers, using trusted root CA certs to create legitimate-seeming SSL certs, and on-the-wire JavaScript code injection... I reckon I could sell that to my super-sekrit-PHB as a worthwhile research project. )