Also, what is your take on Max Tegmark's quantum suicide experiment. Would it work? If yes would that imply that each of us should expect to live a really long time subjectively?
Also, what is your take on Max Tegmark's quantum suicide experiment. Would it work? If yes would that imply that each of us should expect to live a really long time subjectively?
On a more sociological level, D-Wave earned a lot of bad blood with the academic QC community by making false, inflated, and overhyped claims (with a primary offender being its founder, Geordie Rose, who's since left the company). And I certainly took them to task for those sorts of things on my blog. Then the D-Wave folks met with me, John Preskill, and other academics, and pledged to improve in how they communicated, so I was nicer to them for a while. Then they went back to egregious hype about speedups that weren't real, so I criticized them again. Nothing more to it than that. :-)
Regarding quantum suicide: no, I do NOT recommend killing yourself any time anything happens in your life that makes you unhappy, on the theory that other versions of you will survive, in other branches of the quantum-mechanical wavefunction where the bad event didn't happen. This is partly because, even assuming you accept the Many-Worlds Interpretation, "your" moral concern and responsibility presumably extend only to those branches that are in "your" future -- you have no contact with the other branches! And partly it's because I take it as almost an axiom of rationality that, if a metaphysical belief leads you to do "obviously insane" things with your life, then it's probably time to look for a better metaphysical belief. :-) (I wouldn't say the same about scientific or mathematical beliefs.)
The death of natural causes qualifies too.
There's many reasons to believe that objects that exit our light cone continue to exist after they do, even though they could never have any future interaction with us to confirm that. (Say a spaceship leaves Earth at near the speed of light in a straight line, and then enough time passes that the space between the ship and Earth is expanding so fast that the spaceship or any kind of signal from the spaceship would have to travel faster than light to return to Earth, which is impossible. Believing that the spaceship disappears when it exits our light cone requires believing in unnecessarily more complicated physics.)
This is certainly one understanding about what science should be (although not a scientific one interestingly enough). Personally I prefer Thomas Kuhn's demarcation, which by my understanding concentrates more on whether a scientific program is producing interesting predictions which turn out to be true.
In other words, the method to create interesting predictions which turn out to be true is to create interesting predictions, then test those predictions, and update your understanding of the world based on them. Once your world-model is good enough, your predictions will often be true. And, perhaps, eventually your predictions will be so often true that they become uninteresting, so you must move on to other questions.
The heliocentric model of the solar system made less accurate predictions than the geocentric model for years, because the geocentric model was mature and had had lots of tweaks applied to it. In that time, you could have asked the heliocentric model to make a prediction, and shown that it was wrong compared to the geocentric model. You would have been wrong to conclude that heliocentrism was wrong though, it just hadn't matured as a theory enough yet.
All models are wrong, but some are useful.
Lots of people think so (e.g. unmeasurable things predicted by theory like parallel universes, but also things like evil or God or the color purple), but by definition it's hard to be very sure, or to transfer your own confidence in such things to others.
Lots of these kinds of questions reduce to quibbling about definitons; and also by definition, if we can't test the thing then the universe isn't going to punish us either way for believing or not.
If we can’t test the thing then what we are discussing is faith, not science.
Nothing wrong with faith and beliefs but I think it’s important to differentiate between these things and science because often times science is used as a basis for untestable beliefs and then people really start to think that those untestable beliefs are actually backed by scientific research.
Would you say that the only moral way to implement quantum suicide is with a Doomsday Device that would destroy the entire world, thus ensuring your actions won't affect anybody else even in the worlds where you die?