The kind of fraud prevented by a PIN enabled chip card is supposedly pretty rare. What would be more useful is a standard for browser attached chip card readers to bring the anti-fraud protections of a chip card to everyday Internet transactions.
https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/chip-n-pin-cloning/21502/
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/09/13/chip_and_pin_securi...
The second on you mention is based on exploiting flawed RNGs in certain ATM implementations and using that to replay transactions that happened elsewhere. Fix is obvious: don't use flawed RNGs.
Third known attack on EMV is similar to the "accept any PIN" part of the first, but done by MitMing the interface between terminal and card. This relies on the fact, that "No PIN was required" and "Correct PIN entered" produces same transaction certificate. This also can be mitigated by altering the terminal configuration.
On the one hand it's true that all these flaws can be worked around. But on the other hand, how did card companies not bring in cryptographers to help them get this stuff right in the first place? Did they not think it was important?
The TLS journey is illustrative. Originally SSL is hand-rolled crypto. And so SSL 1.0 is so bad it was never really used, their second attempt, SSL 2.0 is still pretty flawed, it's no longer "Herp, I eat paste" bad but even SSL 3.0 still suffers from some pretty bad decisions where clearly engineers who've heard of encryption but aren't experts are making too many cryptographically important decisions.
TLS 1.0 goes to the IETF. So now there's a wider pool looking at this stuff, but firstly it's still trying to be compatible with SSL and secondly these are still just more engineers, not cryptographers. Even in TLS 1.2 actual crypto people only get involved at the end, and they're basically asked (like a poor submission to r/crypto) "Is this OK?" rather than "What would _you_ do here?". It's hard to say "This is not OK" even if your gut instinct is screaming, unless you can prove it. So that's weaker than we'd like.
Finally in TLS 1.3 crypto people are involved from the outset, serious mathematical crypto people who say things like "In this paper we show that under the stated threat model an attacker cannot discover key C in this protocol without having key A if the PRF meets the criteria laid down in reference Z" and they helped produce what we expect to be the most secure version of TLS.
Now, TLS 1.3 took _years_ longer than SSL 2.0, but banks don't do anything quickly anyway. So why didn't EMV take its time and produce something better by hiring in cryptographers to design this stuff? No cryptographer would go "Oh, yeah, just ask for four numbers and if they're all different that's good enough".
And by the way nothing technically prevents the issuers to combine EMV application with some PKCS#11 applet with X.509 certificate on the same physical card. EMV is in fact to some extent explicitly overdesigned to allow not only this but even multiple EMV "cards" on same physical chip.
One interesting idea would be to do EMV transaction over the internet by just forwarding the PDUs sent to the card over the internet, but it has lots of subtle usability and security issues to be really practical.
But my point is that if EMV had chosen to use X.509 instead of inventing their own certificate format then we could re-use the existing infrastructure with zero cost.
Passing arbitrary APDUs from webpages to your card isn't a great idea and it will be SLOW since it will require multiple round-trips -- it's already slow enough just reading objects from smartcards. This is the mechanism used by Citrix/MS Remote Desktop, which is to forward a PC/SC connection -- this has a disadvantage that the remote side must have drivers and is also real slow, but the advantage that the resource can be used for anything, just like it were local.
For what it's worth, I'm the author of some smartcard middleware (CACKey) and have worked with the EMV specification and EMV applets to a lesser degree.
Are lost and stolen cards not a common problem? I suppose if the card holder reports it to the credit card company fast enough, it would prevent fraudulent charges from going through, but it would be nice if the person who found/stole the card(s) wasn't able to just use it without having to enter a PIN to do so.
If the card is reported stolen, all such online transactions are (should be) blocked, and the risk is up to both the issuer (you could ship cards that insist on all transactions needing to be online, and some cards intended for people who struggle to manage their money do that) and the merchant (you can insist on going online for every transaction).
However, forcing every transaction online is super annoying. Train sat in a tunnel? No card purchased G&T for you until it gets out again. Internet down at the burger shack? No burger until their Internet is back up. Merchants would usually rather risk some fraud for smaller purchases, than lose sales when there's a problem.
"Weird money" causes the same issues, it's rare in the US but some places deliberately issue loads of different money that's all theoretically worth the same but you rarely see some types. In England for example a Scottish or Northern Irish bank note, issued with the name of some company you've never heard of, is still "worth" the same as familiar English notes. Except if you live closer to France than Scotland you've probably never seen one before. Maybe it's fake. Should you, as a shopkeeper, risk taking this weird-looking money? Again, risk of fraud versus risk of a lost sale.
[0] https://www.nasdaq.com/article/credit-card-fraud-and-id-thef...