Comment by mrsteveman1 | Hacker News Reader

Comment by mrsteveman1 | Hacker News Reader

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Take a look at ATP, specifically the AF4GUD3A and AF8GUD3A, for 4GB and 8GB respectively.

Digikey[1] and Arrow[2] generally sell the 4GB for $15 and the 8GB for $25. They make larger versions too, if you need them.

The 'A' stands for aMLC, they're using normal MLC flash (which most consumer SD cards no longer use, but is generally much more reliable than TLC) but they use it in 1-bit per cell mode like SLC. They make traditional SLC cards as well, but the price skyrockets.

The aMLC cards have very good endurance ratings, but they're still cheaper than SLC cards. The firmware and controller are designed to prevent sudden power loss issues, which is apparently the root cause of a lot of SD card corruption on the Pi.

They're also supposed to have lifetime (i.e. SMART) monitoring, but it's a vendor specific command set rather than something smartmontools can read. ATP has a tool for it that probably only runs on Windows.

I've been using those aMLC cards in a bunch of Pi3 and Pi Zero W devices for months, I've never seen them become corrupted or fail to boot even once, despite being pretty hard on them, compiling stuff, yanking the power, etc.

For comparison, a Samsung Ultra+ card became corrupted after a single power loss. The device was running Windows 10 IoT Core at the time, it never booted again and had to be re-flashed.

[1] https://www.digikey.com/product-detail/en/atp-electronics-in...

[2] https://www.arrow.com/en/products/af4gud3a-waaxx/atp-electro...

Could a lot of this be mitigated by having better file systems?

A small amount of it, yes, but it's the card itself causing corruption issues most of the time, it happens even on devices where the filesystem is read-only. The controller will write and move things around for maintenance purposes even if the host hasn't issued a write command.

The cheap SD cards just aren't designed for anything except being used in consumer devices with batteries, where sudden power loss is rare and losing data isn't going to cause a plane to crash or result in someone not receiving a dose of insulin.

So when they suddenly lose power, they aren't always capable of ensuring that whatever task they were carrying out at the time is actually completed and did not accidentally destroy data.

And apparently the consumer SD card controllers are really there to manage and remap parts of the flash that were defective before ever leaving the factory.

It's probably cheaper to build over-provisioned cards with a simple controller that can deal with manufacturing defects in the field, than to do QA on 200 million thumbnail sized NAND die every month and still try to profit while selling them for a fraction of a penny each.

It seems very much possible to fix data corruption of a broken flash translation layer of SD cards with yet another translation layer using erasure coding. Whatever the controller does or doesn't it still can only write in blocks, we just have to make sure erasure codes are at least a block size apart from the data.

At least for me, the failure mode in most cases had the card simply erroring out on accesses (even writes!) to particular sectors. Other sectors would allow to write, so it wasn't that the card had run out of sectors with write lifetimes. When you're not given anything to work with, even corrupted data, extra ECC isn't going to do you any good. My conjecture (with no data) is that the card's FTL was itself corrupted.

EDIT: and in no cases I saw did the cards I was testing give me truly 'corrupt' data. Just either error codes, or stale data, or occasionally data from another sector entirely. They've got metric shittonnes of ECC internally (to make up for the crappy NANDs), and will do a better job than you can at detecting errors.

Right, so, if we use virtual blocks the size of the physical blocks and either parity block or one of the data blocks are destroyed it is still possible to get the data. And with writes if a write fails our layer can just try to write a bit farther and farther until it succeeds.

In general you don't have access to the physical block size. And it can change even within a given lot.

Exact block size is not necessary, big safe choice is fine too. But I suspect it's trivial to detect it with benchmarks, as writing even a byte over a block size would require overwriting two physical blocks instead of one, which is much slower.

Btrfs will detect these corruptions and result in EIO so at least corrupt data isn't propagating beyond the file system. While you can set metadata and data to DUP, and thereby get automatic recovery from corruption, it could still fail if the card colocates the two copies into the same page or block on the sd card. So if the corruption cause can affect multiple parts of a page or block, recovery may still not be possible. And also you're doing double the writes, so half the write speed, and half the lifetime. Another option is Btrfs raid1 if you can stick two cards into the device.

XFS has metadata checksums, enabled by default when using xfsprogs 3.2.3+ but data is a much bigger footprint so you can still get hit with silent data corruption. And ext4 any day now is going to start to default to metadata checksums as well.

For those file systems, you can use dm-integrity or dm-verity. https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/DMIntegrity

Depending on what the errors are, you could design a filesystem where the apparent block size is a bit smaller than the underlying disk's block size, giving you room to add some sort of error correction code to the bits you write. Then a single-bit error (even if the controller moves a block around within the disk without telling you) can be corrected by the filesystem driver, and the correct data re-written.

(I also want a filesystem that does this so that you have room for a proper authenticated encryption mode for your full-disk encryption - if your apparent block size is the same as your physical disk block size, either you have no room for an authentication tag and you're using a pretty fragile scheme for making your ciphertext tamper-resistant, or you kill performance because you need to read the authentication tag from another block. Current disk encryption software tends to choose the former.)

Then a single-bit error (even if the controller moves a block around within the disk without telling you) can be corrected by the filesystem driver, and the correct data re-written.

In my experience, flash corruption of the type found in SD cards are completely blank (00) or erased (FF) blocks, not single-bit errors. Remember that SD already has a layer of error correction to handle those from the raw flash.

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