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Comment by Chaebixi | Hacker News Reader

There was a very similar incident in 1971 ("code word hatefulness"). Back then, three tapes were kept next to a EBS transmitter, two real alerts and one for testing. One day, an operator accidentally loaded the real alert rather than the correct test alert, and many stations prepared to tell the country the nuclear war was imminent.

The fix was to:

> …In the past three tapes, one for the test and two for actual emergencies, were hanging on three labeled hooks above the transmitter… In the future only the test tape will be left near the transmitter. The two emergency tapes [will be] be sealed in clearly marked envelopes and placed inside a nearby cabinet.

http://conelrad.blogspot.com/2010/09/code-word-hatefulness-g...

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I'm glad the popular discourse has made it from "train employees better" to "design better interfaces" in this case. But as you point out, this is far, far from a new problem.

It's as if we lived in a world where bridges have been built for decades with structural engineers as optional, rather than required by building code. If your project had a budget for a structural engineer, you hired one, but if not, fine, you just had your construction contractor do their best.

And so now a bridge just collapsed again (fortunately everyone got off in time) and we're talking about how we really ought to design bridges better, but no one is suggesting the obvious, that we legislate building codes that require structural engineers as part of the bridge-building process.

I know this is a controversial idea, as it opens up the question of UX design certification and licensure (if you require UX for critical infrastructure, what are the qualifications?), which can lead to all sorts of unintended consequences of gatekeeping, exclusion, and administrative bloat. But I think Hawaii makes it clear that the status quo is unsafe and unsustainable.

> I know this is a controversial idea, as it opens up the question of UX design certification and licensure (if you require UX for critical infrastructure...But I think Hawaii makes it clear that the status quo is unsafe and unsustainable.

Or even a "code" like the National Electrical Code, which one would be required to comply with when working on critical infrastructure. That's how electricians apply the safety experience gained from previous unsafe practices.

That's a good example. Shockingly poor foresight.

It's similar to the "A gun is always loaded" principle. Unless you can tell at a glance that a firearm is not in a ready-to-fire state, you treat it as if it is. People are clumsy and forgetful, and you only have to mess up once.

Leaving the live rounds right next to the blanks, in that way, is pretty indefensible. (Ignoring of course that blanks can still kill, for this analogy.)

>Unless you can tell at a glance that a firearm is not in a ready-to-fire state, you treat it as if it is

That's when you need to treat it like it is the most.

You'd really exercise more caution with a broken-open shotgun than a closed one?

Not more, but I wouldn't let my guard down just because it's playing dead.

>Unless you can tell at a glance that a firearm is not in a ready-to-fire state

Chance you are actually able to say that vs. chance you made a mistake in reasoning that conclusion? Still not a bet worth taking.

The at a glance condition is probably the one where you stick a brightly colored piece of plastic in the chamber to act as an unarmed flag. Still best to be careful at all times IMO.

A blank round looks totally different from a 'live' round with a projectile.

Don't assume there is just one kind of blank, and don't assume blanks can't kill you.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blank_(cartridge)#/media/File:...

The first bullet here is a blank.

A 'bullet' can't be a blank, as a bullet is a (normally) inert projectile.

Going for the 'technically correct' award, are we?

Yes, the correct term is indeed 'cartridge'.

Not really, your entire argument is silly. You should be running through ACTS/PROVE regardless of the state of your firearm or its load.

The point of a drill is to drill the procedure into people, so that when it is required the people are operating on autopilot without the need to actively think about the actions that they are performing. I would prefer to see the only two tapes next to the transmitter are the emergency tapes. If there is a drill then the drill setup will replace these tapes with the test tapes, and maybe place a corrupt tape there once in a while. With this fix, in an emergency situation it's suddenly someone has to remember to get the tape out of the cabinet (was it Alice's or Bob's cabinet that we put them in?) and use that rather than follow the process that has been rehearsed. This whole scenario whiffs of improper drill setup, not a failure of following the drill.

"Scolding the ape" is not a viable UI option. The time for "carrot and stick" has passed. Today's solutions need to leverage volition and obviation, to prevent the opportunity for human error to occur.

I'm not scolding the ape, I'm scolding the organ grinder. When a drill deviates from the actions taken in an emergency it becomes a pantomime of little value.

I totally agree that the solution should leverage obviation to prevent human error in an emergency, that's what a drill is all about.

> When a drill deviates from the actions taken in an emergency it becomes a pantomime of little value.

Sending an emergency alert isn't an action that requires split-second muscle memory. I think slight deviations in the drill vs. the real thing are fine in this case, in order to prevent false alarms.

There's no one-size-fits-all solution here, you have to analyze the trade-offs around speed and the cost of a false alarm.

It hasn't prevented a false alarm, which is why it hit the news... it's interesting that there is a lot of hang up on false negative (false alarm) and very little discussion about a false positive (hitting the test button instead of the real alarm)

> It hasn't prevented a false alarm, which is why it hit the news...

That's because they forgot the lesson decades ago. It seems like the 1971 event is a forgotten piece of cold war history. I haven't seen any mention of it in the couple of news articles I read.

> it's interesting that there is a lot of hang up on false negative (false alarm) and very little discussion about a false positive (hitting the test button instead of the real alarm)

We haven't ever had a nuclear missile attack, and even if we had one, there's very little anyone could actually do to protect themselves. The alert seems more of a courtesy than a real actionable warning. The fear and panic of a false alarm are real, though. Also, if there are too many false alarms, they turn into crying wolf and will be ignored.

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