Comment by printf_kek0 | Hacker News Reader

Comment by printf_kek0 | Hacker News Reader

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> Hate speech is not an opinion in this sense: it is not something presented as an argument or topic for discussion.

According to J.S. Mill, free speech should only be constrained to the extent that it violates what he calls the harm principle:

"The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."

He makes a distinction between causing harm and causing offense. Revulsion, disgust, psychologically upsetting speech, discriminatory speech, insults and so forth fall under the latter category. Free speech which merely causes offense should not be prohibited according to Mill however controversial or contrary to social norms such speech is.

But how strong the definition of the "harm principle" should be is subject to debate.

Contrast for instance, screaming "Fire!!" in a theater - which might cause injury and death from a crowd stampede - with "All <insert_ethnic_group> are inherently inferior to <insert_other_ethnic_group>".

The difference between causing harm and offense is that harm is universally injurious, whereas as what causes offense is only experienced subjectively.

Although I find blatant hate speech detestable, there is a worrying trend where a majority of people consider hate speech to mean "anything that we disagree with". In our times, it is difficult to speak frankly or be a contrarian without being demonized. And this is precisely what J.S. Mill calls "tyranny of the majority" and consequentially what leads to loss of individuality in society.

We don’t really need to worry about harm versus offense, it’s enough to ask, is there harm to a person in such-and-such a situation?

We should also recognise that the reasonable apprehension of harm is often an allowable basis for an action in law. For example, to assault someone is to present them with a clear threat of harm, whereas battery is to actually carry through with the harm.

Defamation (libel, slander) is recognised to be a problem for a similar reason. If someone presents misleading and disparaging things about me to the public, of course people are free not to believe it and it may be that nothing will happen; but I very reasonably fear damage to my career and social status. We recognise defamation as a crime even when no harm has been demonstrated to occur.

Does hate speech cause harm? Not directly, since sticks and stones may break my bones but words can never hurt me. Like defamation, however, it can mislead to a point where people reasonably expect injury to their career or social standing; and like assault, it can constitute a threat of bodily or other harm. Many of the people who push agendas of hatred are little interested in the outcome of the democratic process or in dialogue with the people they hate — they just want those people excluded (or deported or worse).

We live in a time, unfortunately, where we aren’t all working together with a good solid understanding of “public dialogue”, “harm” and “the threat of harm”.

People feeling bad is not harm; but often that is close by. The absence of injury does not mean we can ignore the possibility of it.

On the other hand, though, if we can’t see a concrete harm that (a) has occurred or (b) is clearly in the offing — if all there is, is some hurt feelings — then a restriction of speech would constitute an offence against a person’s rights.

As with many topics of dispute, there's a bit of a gap between the prescriptions of advocates and the fears of those who oppose circumscription of hate speech. Most proposed legislation falls in line with Mill's principle, and indeed, general legal precedent over inchoate offenses. For example, the genocide convention to which the US is a signatory takes a Millian perspective on calls to minority persecution that are not effectively legislated in US law.

You appear to be arguing that that doesn't hurt everyone equally is not really harmful?

It is not difficult to discern whether a candidate for hate speech violates Mill's harm principle. Speech of the form

    "All <insert_ethnic_group> are inherently inferior to <insert_other_ethnic_group>"

does not exist in a vacuum without any corresponding systemic / institutional problem. I think you're saying speech like that merely causes offense, and not harm, which gives me the general impression that you are arguing in bad faith.

> I think you're saying speech like that merely causes offense, and not harm, which gives me the general impression that you are arguing in bad faith.

It seems you understand the correct answer in accordance with Mill, but then willfully choose to ignore that answer since it differs with your personal value system.

To be very direct, hate speech does not violate the harm principle in the same immediacy or capacity as does yelling FIRE! in a crowded theater.

Well, no, it certainly might, in some circumstances. Just as yelling "FIRE!" in some circumstances might - e.g. yelling something virulently racist while standing between two ethnic groups heatedly confronting each other in the street.

That is an invalid comparison. There is a world of difference between panic and anger.

Well, evidently I don't think it's invalid. Just asserting that doesn't achieve much. I haven't given this a great deal of thought, but it seems the specific emotions are so far irrelevant; what is relevant is whether an action causes harm, or may be predicted to do so/usually does so.

> Well, evidently I don't think it's invalid.

Fortunately, courts in the US do not have trouble discerning this difference.

Maybe if you made your points on here without seeming offensively snarky in your every sentence, you might have more success. "Don't be snarky."

I'd challenge you to find some specific emphasis about immediacy in Mill's explanation of the harm principle, but I don't think you're arguing in good faith either.

In that case how would hate speech qualify as a valid exception to liberty according to Mill?

I am having trouble with all the disembodied concepts in your question. The very notion of classifying hate speech differently from "regular" speech, is predicated on the idea that some speech does, in fact, cause harm.

If J.S. Mill were here right now, he might concede that it is hard to find philosophical justification to treat the crime of yelling "FIRE" in a crowded movie theater differently than the crime of yelling "FIRE" in a crowded movie theater with the intent of killing people of a specific ethnic background...

No writer in the 19th century could have conceived of what "speech" would mean 150 years later in the context of instant worldwide communication. But Mill would not have trouble classifying the expression of certain opinions in certain contexts as causing harm. There is no major logical twist required to "infringe" on liberty in the case of hate speech, and remain consistent with Mill's writings.

> The very notion of classifying hate speech differently from "regular" speech, is predicated on the idea that some speech does, in fact, cause harm.

That completely ignores many of the concepts addressed in chapter 2. If you have to discern harm from context and then use that to classify speech in such a way that it can (or could be) silenced you are violating liberty, according to Mill. Harmful speech is not the same as offensive speech. The difference is the cause of injury. Does the speech itself produce the injury or does it manifest derivative responses that are injurious, such as a fist punch?

> If J.S. Mill were here right now, he might concede that it is hard to find philosophical justification to treat the crime of yelling "FIRE" in a crowded movie theater differently than the crime of yelling "FIRE" in a crowded movie theater with the intent of killing people of a specific ethnic background...

Not relevant. The intent is to kill people either way.

> But Mill would not have trouble classifying the expression of certain opinions in certain contexts as causing harm.

Mill's writing absolutely disagrees with this. Read chapter 4. He provides specific examples.

> Not relevant. The intent is to kill people either way.

Exactly, when there was always intent to harm, it is easy to see how speech causes harm.

> The difference is the cause of injury. Does the speech itself produce the injury or does it manifest derivative responses that are injurious, such as a fist punch?

You are contradicting yourself. The word "FIRE" isn't causing direct injury, it manifests derivative responses that involve people getting hurt.

> Mill's writing absolutely disagrees with this. Read chapter 4. He provides specific examples.

Okay, I re-read chapter 4. None of the examples justify this reading. Mill is far more focused on private behavior than public speech in that chapter. He thinks polygamy is bad because it subjugates women, but at the time Mormons literally fled the country to the Utah desert, so he has a hard time justifying why an American would call for interference with the ostensibly consensual polygamy of the early Mormon Church.

Nowhere does Mill suggest that speech can't cause harm.

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