Since anyone that received an "unfair advantage" with government-issued fiat can turn around and use it to get an unfair advantage in bitcoin as well?
Or to put it another way, how do you measure "equality of opportunity" if not by "equality of outcome"? If your theory of "equality of opportunity" differs from the measured "equality of outcome", doesn't that automatically mean you've omitted some characteristic of the real world from your theory?
Many aspects of our societies have lottery-like qualities.
But this seems like "too convenient" an explanation to me, it could be used to justify literally any system. For any system, one could assert that actually the opportunity is equal, but the variance is so great that the measured outcome "accidentally" arose out of the totally-equal-honest "opportunity" probability distribution.
I'm not prepared to accept such weak justifications of any supposed equal-opportunity system, I'd prefer to have a system where the outcome provided me with some verifiable indicator that the original opportunities were actually equal, in a similar sort of way where one can have verifiable proofs in cryptographic protocols.
That is indeed a large part of the point of the social/welfare state.
Here is Joseph Dejacques using "libertarian" for the first time in a letter to Proudhon (incidentally also an early feminist work; the letter was a rebuke to Proudhons male chauvinism):
> Flogger of woman and absolute serf of man, Proudhon Magnan, you use your words for a lash. Like a slave-driver you seem delighted to disrobe your beautiful victims (on paper) and flagellate them with invectives. Moderate anarchist, liberal, but not libertarian, you want free exchange of cotton and candles and you seek to protect man against woman in the exchange of affectional human passion. You cry against the great barons of capital, and you would rebuild a proud barony of man on vassal-woman. Logician with misfit eyeglasses, you are unable to read the lessons of the present or the past; you can discern nothing that is elevated or at a distance or in the perspective of the future.
(EDIT: Worth noting above is that he sets "moderate anarchist" up as less radical than "libertarian")
And this is another paragraph from the same letter, denouncing not just property rights (one of things he admired in Proudhon's was his "property is theft" slogan) but denouncing restrictions on consumption:
> Do I need, for example, one sun for myself, one river for myself, one forest for my own, or all the houses in all the streets for my own? Have I the right to become the proprietor of them to the exclusion of others, especially when I do not need them? If I have not that right, is it any more just for me to wish, as under the system of contracts, to measure to each one—according to his accidental ability to produce—just what proportion he should receive of all things; how much of the sun’s rays he is entitled to, how many cubic feet of air and of water shall he allotted to him, or the extent of his promenades in the forests; what number or the parts of the houses he may occupy, what streets he may walk in and what streets he must keep out of?
While you probably won't agree with much he says - as a libertarian socialist even I disagree with much of what he says (he's very much what Marx would have written off as one of the utopian socialists, or a hippie a century early), the letter is well worth a read both because it has historical importance in being the start of libertarianism (right wing libertarianism was first born about a century later), but also because it is incredibly beautifully written even if one disagrees with it:
https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/joseph-dejacque-on-t...
But right-wing libertarianism prioritize property rights over liberty.