Firstly, it acts as a disincentive to real investment: the rate of deflation is effectively an interest rate earned on funds stuffed into mattresses. If deflation is at 5%, no one will want to invest in any project with less than a 5% return over the same period. Risk and liquidity premiums would also increase even for investments that do provide a higher return than the deflation rate.
Secondly, existing long-term debts would become extremely onerous for borrowers. The implications for outstanding mortgages could make the recent default epidemic pale in comparison.
However, it's worth pointing out that the 19th century was largely a period of sustained, gradual deflation, and was also a period of tremendous economic growth with little of the amplified boom-bust cycle we experienced in the 20th century.
I'd conjecture that a climate in which a small amount of deflation is accepted as a given would foster economic decision making that tends to focus more on real wealth-creation, and less on the kind of financial abstractions which have led to the recent turmoil. As long as we could manage the transition from a slightly inflationary to a slightly deflationary economy (i.e. find a way to deal with the problem of outstanding debt), I'm not so sure it would be quite the disaster that the article portrays.