This forcing of opinionated things goes on my nerves. How about develop the browser, and let the mass decide what they use. Amazon was 100% HTTP for 20 years (except the single login page) - it worked very well.
This forcing of opinionated things goes on my nerves. How about develop the browser, and let the mass decide what they use. Amazon was 100% HTTP for 20 years (except the single login page) - it worked very well.
It's Google's browser forcing one of Google's own gTLDs to HTTPS. There is no masses involved. Anything else on the HSTS preload list is there at the request of the domain or gTLD owners.
> Amazon was 100% HTTP for 20 years (except the single login page) - it worked very well.
Sure it did! It also allowed any interested party to observe all your interactions with Amazon. What worked 20 years ago doesn't necessarily work today. Standards evolve, new attack vectors emerge, and people's needs for privacy or what they expect to be private changes.
Plus this isn't even the governments intervention, this is browser vendors raising the bar for online security.
https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/Home/chromium-se...
I use .local for, well, my local network and I find that Chrome can't find them half the time (telling me that the server can't be found or that I don't have internet connection). Safari, Firefox and even command line tools find them without skipping a beat while Chrome insists that I'm offline.
I think the culprit is the internal DNS cache. If, for whatever reason it can't find the server once, then it gets stored in the cache as unreachable and needs a cache flush to fix. To add insult to injury, in previous versions of Chrome you could disable the internal DNS system, but apparently not anymore.
This is a good thing, of course. Security should be global, not dependent on what browser you happen to use.
Also, wouldn't bundling (tens of) thousands of domains start to add up, and slow down first page load for regular browser use?
I'm sure I must be missing something, because this doesn't seem very logical to me.
> These sites do not depend on the issuing of the HSTS response header to enforce the policy, instead the browser is aleady aware that the host requires the use of SSL/TLS before any connection or communication even takes place. This removes the opportunity an attacker has to intercept and tamper with redirects that take place over HTTP.
Read this: https://scotthelme.co.uk/hsts-preloading/
> Also, wouldn't bundling (tens of) thousands of domains start to add up, and slow down first page load for regular browser use?
Why would it? Checking in a data structure if the domain the user requested should be loaded over HTTPS can be done in a perfectly efficient way. A hash table would give you O(1) lookup times on average and there's other things you can use to mitigate the worst case lookup of O(n).
I was hoping the article would cover the scaling aspect a bit more. I guess it's just meant to be a mid-step towards browsers defaulting to HTTPS at some unknown point in the future.
[1]: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1LqpwT2aAekrWPtLui5GYdHSG...
If there's an attacker between you and the website, you will never see the 301 redirect. The preload list was designed for that kind of scenario.