And agree that Troy's description is best as it takes us away from unhelpful metaphors.
And agree that Troy's description is best as it takes us away from unhelpful metaphors.
If you believe your fingerprint data has been compromised, can you change your fingerprint data?
Yep. I can use another finger. If all 10 have been compromised you probably have bigger issues.
Or you just turn it off.
I'm usually let them tell their tale (out of my room, of course), ask a lot of questions, nod with them happily, and in the end I say thanks, but I'm sorry, I don't disclose my info, full stop. Their butthurt is sometimes too cool to watch without popcorn.
If I am who I say I am I should be able to answer all three without much thinking and answer naturally to my name.
[1]: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/08/10/htc_caught_storing_f...
1) lifted it off some surface. 2) got the right fingerprint when they did it 3) modeled a fake fingerprint well enough that it would fool touchID 4) Was able to get access to your touchID device while you weren't aware or unable to stop them
Most experts recommend that you instead use a pin-code of at least 6 numbers, or a password of at least 12 random characters using at least one number, and at one punctuation mark. In that case the attacker's algorithm changes to
1) Check for posted note containing password on computer monitor, or 2) Check purse or wallet for posted note containing passcode
It's not too difficult to get access to the full 50000-odd combinations (see https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204587 for where that number comes from) Apple hardware can identify with a little work.
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/30/hacker-fa...
Implementation matters more than what the sensor is authing with.
Like, say, middle - index - ring.
It would be doubly unique.
biometrics make poor passwords.
Because security that people use is >> security people won't use
You can't change them, therefor they make poor secrets.