This is a great and really important point. But shouldn't warranting the "encryption" label come down to the security guarantee of the algorithm in question, in the use cases it's meant for? I don't see why non-traditional data obfuscation algorithms can't be equally valid methods of "encryption" just because they are architecturally different. After all there are plenty of traditional encryption approaches that have been deprecated and deemed insufficiently insecure. So it'd be a bigger problem if the definition of encryption became so narrow that practitioners assume security guarantees based on use of the term alone.

IMO the key is that new encryption methods demonstrate levels of security in their intended use cases that users deem sufficiently strong. I agree that all closed-source methods leave room for misleading statements (and I won't speak to Numerai as I don't have any additional insight on their approach). But any algorithm can and should be benchmarked--generally and vs. common standards--to avoid confusion. Serious commercial & public sector users will be quick to ensure so, especially in lieu of massive social proof.

My thought here is that if we draw the line on what warrants "encryption" by saying it's got to be a traditional key-based system, or sufficiently similar to existing approaches, we risk stifling innovation in the space by denying new entrants an industry-standard term that buyers are trained to seek. Non-traditional doesn't necessarily mean non-secure. Would love to hear your thoughts on this.