The attach on Hamburg earlier in the war (July 1943) probably had more impact but even then the Allied air raids on Germany actually achieved disproportionally little given the huge resource allocated to them.
However, bombing did force the Germans to prioritise air defence of their heartlands over tactical air operations against allied ground forces, so that German ground forces and their logistics chains operated under punishingly hostile skies from D-Day onwards.
[1] https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/53742/the-bombing-war/
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Wages_of_Destruction
[3] https://www.amazon.co.uk/German-War-Nation-Under-1939-45-x/d...
[EDIT - reworded for clarity and additional detail]
As especially the USA's industrial output was much larger than Germany's, bombers might still have been a good investment, even if it didn't actually reduce Germany's industrial capacity, because it did reduce its capacity to wage ground war.
EDIT: Also, even if Germany's industrial output did grow during WWII, it still tied up an enormous amount of resources: "The Allied bombing campaign also tied up valuable manpower, with Albert Speer (Germany's Minister of Armaments) estimating that in the summer of 1944 between 200,000 and 300,000 men were permanently employed in repairing oil installations and placing oil production underground. "
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Nazi_Germany#Wartim...
Most notably, in the 2nd half of 1944 they effectively lost the oil imports from Romania; at the same time, they were fighting on three fronts - with the Allies coming up through Italy and crossing the Channel, the Soviets from the east. They had to do an awful lot more with an awful lot less.
Granted, it could be argued that obliterating an important railroad junction like Dresden made logistics (even) harder for the Germans - but again, at that late point in the war it probably didn't matter much.