The malware could have just as easily used the registration of that domain as a flag to start deleting data, no?
The malware could have just as easily used the registration of that domain as a flag to start deleting data, no?
It's probably easier, as you point out, to have the virus delete its keys and wipe itself out. (And has the added benefit of taking some forensic info with it.)
But in a marketing sense, blaming people interfering with your network for the lost data may make you safer, as many victims are likely to prefer you extorting them to the good guys causing data loss by stopping you.
Being a criminal is all about customer service.
Two domains, one defuses the ransomware, the other detonates it.
And one of the domains will be called redwire[randomchars].com, and the other bluewire[randomchars].com. Which one do you sinkhole, the red wire or the blue wire?
The researcher in this case registered the domain right away because he had experience that that creates a positive result. Once that sort of thing starts creating bad results, then researchers will start testing more carefully before grabbing domains.
Although it was only a thought, with what `cesarb` mentioned in mind.
It isn't an either-or proposition, and the psychology of the conflict is important. If you force your opponent consider every possible move to be potentially dangerous, you slow them down by more than just the cost of the game with a domain name. And that's valuable.
Googling for "OODA Loop" might be helpful in thinking about this.