> In cases where the system has not been previously compromised and implanted with DOUBLEPULSAR, the malware will use ETERNALBLUE for the initial exploitation of the SMB vulnerability. This is the cause of the worm-like activity that has been widely observed across the internet.
This is not really any different from Blaster from 2003.
In that case, it was supposedly because of the patch:
> According to court papers, the original Blaster was created after security researchers from the Chinese group Xfocus reverse engineered the original Microsoft patch that allowed for execution of the attack
The patch was
ms03-026: Buffer Overrun In RPC Interface Could Allow Code Execution Published: July 16, 2003
(could, hah)
> The worm was first noticed and started spreading on August 11, 2003
It was a huge problem at college campuses well into September. Students would arrive with their brand new laptops running XP and get hit with the worm 30 seconds after connecting to the network.
Really the main difference is blaster was just an annoyance and mostly just broke random things like the DHCP service, but was easily fixed.
The lack of highly available and remotely exploitable vulnerabilities have made them less common.
Back in 2003, most people were on dialup or had a single machine plugged directly into the Internet. Microsoft had no firewall out of the box. So by default you exposed all your Microsoft networking services to the whole Internet.
NAT changed that, it made it so no one could directly connect to all the vulnerable machines floating around. Your phone is unable to infect other phones on your providers network or the wider internet in this same way.
No one is out mass exploiting those IOT light bulbs with default telnet passwords because they're not exposed directly to the Internet. There are a few however exploiting vulnerable NAT routers... probably the only sort of worm to see widespread success in recent years.
I don't remember that happening with any other type of infection.
From the article:
The above subroutine attempts an HTTP GET to this domain, and if it fails, continues to carry out the infection. However if it succeeds, the subroutine exits. The domain is registered to a well known sinkhole, effectively causing this sample to terminate its malicious activity.