This is for cases where you want the credit but still want the protections afforded by being somewhat anonymous. Similar to WikiLeaks but more focused on allowing the company or entity to solve their problems and representing fairness on all sides.
This is for cases where you want the credit but still want the protections afforded by being somewhat anonymous. Similar to WikiLeaks but more focused on allowing the company or entity to solve their problems and representing fairness on all sides.
The report isn't public yet, but it's on record. You've reported it to the organization funded by Homeland Security to take such reports. In 45 days, CERT will disclose it to the public.[2] CERT may contact the bank themselves. If you do, you can cite the CVE vulnerability number they give you. This gives you some advantages when talking to a bank. "Have your technical people contact Homeland Security's US-CERT at (888) 282-0870 regarding CVE-NNNN" will usually deal with a bank's people. They can't make the problem disappear.
[1] https://vulcoord.cert.org/VulReport/ [2] http://www.cert.org/vulnerability-analysis/vul-disclosure.cf...
Yes, reporting to CERT is "safe"; you almost certainly aren't going to get sued for doing it. But don't count on CERT coordinating a fix or even figuring out how to report flaws to. It's unlikely that anyone at CERT knows who "Zecco" is.
CERT themselves ask you not to submit to CERT unless your vulnerability fits some specific criteria. "Unresponsive vendor" is one of those, but CERT's fine print says that they prioritize severe, multi-vendor vulnerabilities.
Anyone who runs a bug bounty program can tell you how unrealistic it is to rely on CERT for this stuff: triaging reports for just one vendor is a full-time job. CERT wants to get early warnings of things like OS and platform vulnerabilities. I don't think it's a good idea to report those to CERT either, but regardless, CERT isn't set up to handle your CSRF report in some random website.
[1] https://www.a2q2.com/blog/sox/29-cyber-security-and-sox/
There are two types of financial service organizations: the big banks, and random firms (like Zecco was, before Ally bought them).
There's no point in contacting CERT about a Bank of America vulnerability. CERT won't prioritize the report and won't know the right person to talk to, but also, you're a Google search away from finding out who to report to at Bank of America (spoiler: it's Hacker One). These kinds of things don't happen at BofA, not because vulns are hair-on-fire there, but because there's a process in place to handle them.
There's not much point in contacting CERT about a Zecco vulnerability. CERT doesn't know who to contact and doesn't know how to find them and won't spend the time trying. CERT isn't going to publish an unconfirmed report. All CERT is going to do is go to Mitre; you can do that too, and note the guidelines for what will get you a CVE.
The issue here is just TANSTAAFL. It takes a fuckload of effort to triage and confirm vulnerability reports. There's no magic "this is a real vulnerability" certificate you can get CERT or Mitre --- or really anyone who doesn't spend a lot of money to maintain the capability for their own products. If there was, Hacker One wouldn't make half their money selling triage services. :)
>For every valid report they get, they get 3 that aren't valid.
Because taking the time to write and to submit an invalid report is a total waste of the reporter's time. Reports aren't the type of thing that someone will accidentally say "oh this is a severe vulnerability! here's some cash" even though the researcher has submitted bullshit.
So can you talk about "3 that aren't valid" for every valid report? Who makes these? Weird, obscure cranks, of the type who in other industries would be churning out perpetual motion devices? I would expect 80%+ of vulnerability reports to be serious and real - quite different from what you just wrote.
Bug bounties, on average, have a signal:noise ratio that is horrible. I advocate for the programs completely, but they require a lot of planning in order to prevent them from becoming overwhelming. I personally know security engineers at Google and Facebook whose full time job is sorting through nonsense bug bounty reports.
What Tom said about people in Eurasia wanting to cash in on bug bounties is spot on. If you start a bug bounty program, expect to get a deluge of nonsense reports for bullshit like having the Trace HTTP method allowed on an API endpoint. For every one valid report, three - five will be bullshit. Of those that do not reproduce, half will be incomprehensible, and the other half will blatantly ignore the program guidelines or be low effort spam ("content spoofing"). If you offer a cash reward, expect the ratio of valid to invalid to be closer to 1 in 10.
It's a numbers game for these people. The security research industry is bifurcated between rare, sophisticated and highly paid freelancers who do it mostly for passion outside of their day jobs, and opportunistic amateurs who couldn't write a curl command.
From there it's pretty easy to see that "vulnerability spam" would be a thing.
Hacker One doesn't have a program for BofA. You probably found this dummy (and slightly misleading) page: https://hackerone.com/bofa
Why not? If anything the story above shows that a financial institution very much can and post-2008 I believe there many things a government cannot do but there are very few things a bank cannot do.
He went on CNBC to argue that independent security researchers should start a hedge fund that short sells the stocks of companies affected by vulnerabilities. https://youtu.be/jxUWRRDdhVI
He seems to be of the opinion that this would be a less risky strategy than bringing those issues to the attention of many companies. He also believes that profit incentives for researchers will serve the public interest, because it creates economic disincentives against big companies having insecure software.
There are examples of honest people getting fucked over, but this isn't one of them.
As it stands, literally everyone who would have been in a position to be reasonable was someone he'd actively worked at pissing off. Not in the sense of someone he'd pissed off in the past, but as someone he was actively pissing off in conjunction with this issue. The moral of his story is that there's room for aggressive incident reporting, but not if one is going to be an insufferable jerk about it.
That is hilarious.
This was introduced 3 days ago https://twitter.com/martenmickos/status/854321634404061185
HackerOne will work with friendly hackers on a best effort basis to verify the legitimacy of a vulnerability, reach out to and verify the identity of an individual at the affected organization, then share the vulnerability with the organization so it can be resolved.
Seems like it address most of the problems of educating the organization so they don't threaten you.
The more realistic concern here is that for these kinds of findings --- CSRFs in random web applications --- there simply isn't going to be a contact at the target company, and H1 isn't going to find one for you. That's why they point out they can't promise a contact.
You'd be surprised. HackerOne is relatively new, just several years old. Does everyone know OWASP, almost certainly yes. Does everyone know the BSide community? No.
Anyway, H1 can act as a shield, in this case. On the other hand, companies like WhiteHat or Rapid7 are probably more well-known since they will probably spam your security team on a regular basis trying to sell their products.
I think the disclosure assistance is a pretty clever idea for generating new sales leads, since by definition they will be talking to companies with an actual zero day situation.
But any person looking at their homepage would be a lot less concerned. Impressive logo's and a clear story for an enterprise audience.
If other people feel the same way, I'll fork and make a repo. EFF is a great starting point but it is not nearly usable as a HOWTO.
I'm putting my balls on the line by publishing this blog post. Actually I started this blog 10 years ago just to make this page, here is the original page: https://privacylog.blogspot.com/2008/10/pre-announcement.htm...
WeWork leases offices; they have a shared workspace area in all the buildings, but most of their buildings are private offices.
Apart from the fact that there's a good chance the company you're trying to report to already has an H1 program running, what they're promising to do here is to spend some effort trying to track down security contacts for you. They profit from this, of course: if you give them a good bug, and they facilitate its reporting, the target company is very likely to sign up for H1. But it costs you nothing and might solve a problem for you.
(I'm ambivalent about H1 --- we run a couple H1 bounty programs that existed prior to us taking over security at our clients --- but I don't think it's a good idea to be dismissive of them.)
I wonder if an org like the EFF could add this to their scope.
https://twitter.com/Snowden/status/839168025517522944
Maybe if they were required by statute to accept anonymous submissions and make FOIA-style responsible disclosures after a reasonably short period of time, they wouldn't end up colluding right away.
The offensive organization wold probably then still sit on vulnerabilities only it knew about, but at least this would be better than the current situation.
It's a myth far as I know. I've studied them a long time seeing much conflicting info about this. A declassified, historical document I found at one point about them said their job was SIGINT and COMSEC (just communications security!) for U.S. government. A later provision extended this to protecting COMSEC of defense contractors. The IAD seems to have policy-driven stuff about helping protect INFOSEC in general. There could've been a COTS mandate of some sort at some point but it was clearly toothless.
The NSA is mandated to protect communication security of defense sector. That's it. Even then, the defense sector keeps asking them to downgrade the security to let in more quick-moving products from commercial sector that are hacker fodder. They've since started on a program that lets them in after a 90-day evaluation against the lowest standards from Common Criteria. The NSA is the last group that should be responsible for INFOSEC given all this w/ market an utter failure, too.
The groups that have done the most are probably NSF and DARPA for funding strong security with NIST and DISA (esp STIGS) at least trying to do something with hardening guides and crypto recommendations. I prefer reputation-driven nonprofits that are funded with combo of donations, licensing of quality software, and consulting fees. They can't get acquired or be destroyed by changes in government policy.
Unlikely. They are still here to protect americans, in a sense. Stealing money from a bank or a regular business is not on their agenda.
There is a 10% of vulnerabilities that might have re-use for intelligence purpose, but it shall be alright for the bulk of it.
That may be the charter of the the organization. But the individual people running the FBI goals are to 1) be reappointed / not get fired 2) continually expand their budget / power. Given US politics 1&2 are not always congruent esp in short term with "protecting americans".
They aren't like that at all.
2) the Director of the FBI (and other other high level managers) is much more of a political bureaucrat than they are a LEO.
The EFF seems like a good choice. In general you would need to pick an organization that does not have a vested interest in using exploits.
Indeed. Didn't the FBI effectively purchase a zero day to break into the iPhone of the San Bernardino shooter? Didn't they also then not disclose said zero day to Apple?
There's no way that any LE agency can be trusted with this responsibility; I'm not convinced that it can be done by the federal government at all. EFF seems like a reasonable choice, but even non-profits have the potential to be corrupted/subverted (and operating as a dump for zero days has the power to corrupt, for sure, regardless of how moral your organization claims to be on its website).
This definitely falls under the umbrella of hard-problems-in-politics-that-will-not-be-solved-any-time-soon
> The National Security Agency is now able to share raw surveillance data with all 16 of the United States government's intelligence groups, including the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security and Drug Enforcement Administration.
refs: https://www.engadget.com/2017/01/12/obama-expands-the-nsas-a... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Intelligence_Com... http://www.reuters.com/article/us-dea-sod-idUSBRE97409R20130...
If you don't care about your reputation, you post anonymously. An anonymous full disclosure post is a good way to report a bug without dealing with drama about your "incentives".
One time I found a photo printing website made all photos public. They refused to fix, I fully disclosed, it made front page Slashdot. Then the company had to change its name. Maybe it was fun or maybe I get credit but most importantly it gets something from my TODO list to my DONE list. This is very important to me.
I have a 0-day on Apple, not very exciting. I reported in 2015 and they still did not fix. Having this in my inbox is a waste of my time thinking about it. I will FD it.
My experience is that security researchers do not make money unless you run script kiddy programs for stupid bounty programs. When I interviewed for a "security" job all they would ask me about is Microsoft certifications and user access testing. I asked if a TLA offer letter counted as sufficient reference and he said no. At that point I immediately switched from MS CS into MS Finance and MBA and my life has improved (while still being technically challenging and academic.)
So technically my disclosure policy is IJDGAF with two extra weeks as a gentleman's favor. Maybe I'm the bad guy, but that's why I'm here for the lovely discussion on YC. Thanks for sharing.
For a CSRF that you didn't use someone else's account to exploit and that you've told nobody about, and assuming you have no acquaintances who might screw you over by abusing the bug, 30 days and then Pastebin seems like a decent answer.
If any of your friends are shady, just forget about the bug.
The more unpatched vulnerabilities there are in existence, the more lucrative it is to be involved in any part of the computing crimes community.
It's like reglazing a broken window in your neighbor's garage at your own expense, because you don't want burglars to see it and start casing other properties in the same neighborhood based on the conditional probability that a visible broken window indicates a higher incidence of other exploitable vulnerabilities.
It's also important to pursue the very easily exploited vulnerabilities, because when you get rid of all the low-hanging fruit, the people who can't already climb the tree won't survive long enough to learn how. You're cutting a lot of bootstraps so that immature criminals can't pull themselves up by them.
Perhaps there's a breakdown of definitions here. I've lumped bug-bounty hunters and grey hat hackers, along with actual researchers, under "researchers." Stop me now if this isn't who you're referring to.
Now if it is, this route of action goes against the reseachers' monetary incentives. It is in their wallets' interests to have criminals validating the existence of their work. As well as selling the direct findings of one's research, including even minor exploitabilities, which is a given.
If researchers were to constantly give away their work (on even little issues) it would directly lower the cumulative value of cuber-security research, i.e their more expensive projects now sell for less.
The FBI / NCFTA invited me to speak about this vuln because it may have affected many banks at the time. (Please stop laughing.)
They called me to cancel. "Now we're all focused on this big DOS. Do you know anything about DOS that's happening today you can help us with?" I asked if the DOS is affecting the stability of the system or actually breaking anything. And they said yes it is bringing the banks down and affecting revenue.
You can read into this anecdote as you wish.
New York City based their increased focus on petty crimes on it. I don't think it is useful as the basis for a model of policing, though.
In some ways, it is an embodiment of the slippery slope fallacy, where if security is not perfect, it's worthless, in the same sense that a roof with one leak in it is worthless, because that one leak becomes the beachhead for further damage to the roof.
From the original article in 1982:
Consider a building with a few broken windows. If the windows are not repaired, the tendency is for vandals to break a few more windows. Eventually, they may even break into the building, and if it's unoccupied, perhaps become squatters or light fires inside.
Or consider a pavement. Some litter accumulates. Soon, more litter accumulates. Eventually, people even start leaving bags of refuse from take-out restaurants there or even break into cars.
Broken Windows, The Atlantic Monthly, March 1982
--
The way I would put it, based on my visits to my home town of Zagreb, Croatia:
Apathy is contagious.
Have you heard of Elizabeth Kubler-Ross's '5 stages of grief' model that summarizes people's typical responses to bereavement? EKR argued that people generally go through a cycle of denial, anger, bargaining, depression and acceptance. IME this is a good rule of thumb for how people typically handle any kind of unwelcome news.
In this case:
o There is no such problem
o Grr why did you hack us I'll call the police
o How about you take this pittance and STFU
o We're just trying to run a business and you ruined everything
o OK we'll fix it and alert our customersBut stipulate that there's some number here, and the answer is: because nobody in management at Zecco ever built a plan for how to handle incoming vulnerability reports, and so nobody who got the report was empowered to do anything but escalate the issue --- and halfheartedly, at that, because nobody in management at Zecco ever build a policy that ensures anyone cares about vulnerabilities, so this is for them the moral equivalent of a WONTFIX.
How diligently would you escalate a WONTFIX?
Escalation enough?
Large firms wouldn't survive at high enough rates to dominate public life as they do, if they weren't underwritten by the state at every turn.
You can use a lawyer for this, this is a standard piece of advice for other kinds of bounties-- e.g. reporting criminal tax evasion.
In a situation like this I'd probably directly ping taviso or someone else from the Google Project Zero team. Their contact information (email, G+, twitter (DM)) is not impossible to get at.
From there, I could get advice about next steps (the Project Zero team are going to know a few people) or maybe they could run with it themselves (depending on the bug; I don't know what the response would have been in this case).
Mind sharing how you've achieved this? I haven't had the same level of success, with my couple of attempts (thus far) to try to resolve various issues falling flat.
https://vulcoord.cert.org/VulReport/ http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/about/
/sarc
Come up with a good set of guiding principles for members. This would help avoid waiting 7 years and then sticking it online. Not criticising, I'm saying the situation here is pretty screwed up.
Members pay dues, the association provides backing. Company threatens to call the FBI and the association is the one they can deal with.
An organized group can help to provide the needed political pressure so that a properly disclosed vulnerability doesn't ever lead to the FBI and trumped up charges.
A respected group can lend credibility to a researcher. A bank may not give 2 shits about even a well respected member of the community. They will care if it's a group well known for finding and disclosing vulnerabilities.
This seems like an easier problem than the general case of software engineers because the community is smaller and you don't have the conflicting interests of "I can negotiate better on my own". Plus things like membership can be handled more easily, start with a small group of people who absolutely should be members. Extend via application and invite.
I'd like to work in an organization like this. I'm not sure if anyone would want to join. It seems like everyone else is either completely independent like my own IDJGAF strategy or they are full corporate like HackerOne and other brokers.
It's next door to the military intelligence folks.
(ba-da-bump)