1. Another leaker who isn't Snowden
2. A third party who has gained access to the insides of the NSA
I don't see why we're apparently ignoring 2 in this thread. The Snowden leaks made it very, very clear that essentially nothing is unhackable. And it's not like the USA has a monopoly on hacking skill. What else do we know about the NSA? That they perform the largest WireSharking in history, they literally parse most of the internet with a giant collection of programs which I will assume are written in C or C++ for the sake of performance (though a lot of Perl seems to crop up for analysis purposes too).
What are the chances that the NSA have managed to build a huge network with hugely complex interfacing to the entire internet, and huge amounts of software, without opening themselves up to attack by equally sophisticated attackers? I'd say close to zero.
That's the most obvious one to me. I thought everyone assumed it until I saw some of these comment threads. If it's Russian, it probably goes back to Kaspersky tracking the Equation Group. They put together about everything about how they operated. Giving Russian intelligence this information combined with trip-wires or tip-offs on live activity by NSA hackers would let Russian hackers attempt to own their boxes. They could just work from there.
Alternatively, it could be result of long-running infiltrations that U.S. government has been talking about for decades. At various points, U.S. TLA's said China is throwing piles of spies at us in a numbers game whereas Russia was using (I think it was) 4x more than during height of the Cold War. We also know they're easy to infiltrate and have terrible security since Snowden did and showed exactly that. Plus Manning just pulling everything they had from an Army private's account in Middle East. The leaks could've come from infiltrators, too.
So, we have infiltrators, hackers via Kaspersky data (or similar), or insiders that for whatever reason want to humiliate them. Whatever Shadow Brokers say about themselves is just propaganda. They're one of the above with probably typical motivations of agents in those categories.
Now that we've seen more than just tools and exploits leaked (powerpoints, other documents), that doesn't seem plausible anymore.
Not sure if these are related, but the latest round makes pretty clear that there's been either a new leaker or a serious attack.
The NSA uses Windows like everyone else. There are multiple Windows 0day RCEs in this dump, which may not be all of it by far. All it'd take is to find a single Windows server that isn't properly airgapped - and the NSA TAO can't possibly be airgapped given that its job is to hack people over the internet - and you have a foothold.
The incentives for these intelligence agencies are all wrong and I think even if this particular dump isn't traced to a direct compromise of their network, it's bound to happen eventually. They've been operating on the assumption that all nation states work in secret, so even if they get totally hacked by their adversaries the White House will never find out. However, their chain of command would definitely notice if they stopped sending intercepted intel up to them. This means they're strongly incentivised to horde exploits even if they're sure their enemies know the very same exploits and even if they're sure they can't defend themselves.
The Shadow Brokers appear to have at a stroke invalidated the assumption of universal secrecy. These are people who have access to the NSAs most sensitive internal tools and documents, and are simply ... burning it all.
Bingo! Well, a mix of Windows, Linux (esp Red Hat), and Solaris (optionally with trusted extensions). All low-assurance operating systems with history of 0-days plus current ones for at least Windows and Linux. It's not like they didn't know it was coming. High-assurance field, including pioneers in INFOSEC, warned them over and over.
http://lukemuehlhauser.com/wp-content/uploads/Bell-Looking-B...
http://hack.org/mc/texts/classic-multics.pdf
https://web.archive.org/web/20040214043848/http://eros.cs.jh...
Bad news is they have methods today that work better that they could build on. They recently canceled them in favor of a new program with something like a 90-day evaluation. Something short. I remember reading the protection profiles to find the assurance argument required is EAL1: one so low we thought they'd cancel it. Things will only get worse.
we are already aware of a guy who was arrested for having terabytes of classified info, who worked for TAO. i'm not sure how it would have gotten from martin to the (presumably russian) shadow brokers -- maybe he was paid, maybe he was hacked -- but it doesn't seem like a staggering leap to make.
certain politicians aside, exposing TS networks to the internet is not only difficult inside an organization that 'lives in the dark', it will get you severely reprimanded if not fired from your very well paying job, and possibly scuttle your ability to remain cleared and continue your career. classified networks are designed from above so that as much as possible this isn't an issue, and i'm certain it's only intensified since snowden.
i'm not saying by any means it's an impossibility that they were hacked, but i don't see any reason at all to favor that conclusion. like i said, martin worked for TAO, the source of everything the shadow brokers have released. why would you come to the conclusion that they were hacked vs an already known, very likely source candidate?
It would be insiders who oppose what's going on Snowden-style or plants from a foreign, intelligence service.