[1] https://w3techs.com/technologies/history_overview/ssl_certif...
Or they will ignore Google, continue to create bad certs, and users will start getting instructed by sites that they have to manually add a root certificate in order to use they site, and the entire ecosystem will collapse.
I'm not sure how they are at a disadvantage if they have supplied 30% of in-use certificates, and are responsible for 42% of all validations.
While I don't condone Symantec's behaviour, I think google is being a bit hypocritical here. Have you ever tried reporting gmail spammers to google?
EFF ftw!
Do we know that Symantec is being malicious, or just lazy like Google's response to spam?
Or switch browsers. Google needs to (and will) play this so it ends up being unattractive for other browser vendors not to distrust Symantec as well.
I'd much rather be able to say -- 'no, never manually trust a cert', instead of 'well, ok, for now yes in this one case if you're sure there's no typos in the URL... What? Yeah, the text at the top in the little bar... argh'.
I hope I'm missing something here, but even better I hope Symantec and banks get their acts together.
Technically, certificate pinning etc can prevent this, but in practice, yes, this is a possible attack vector.
But it has little to do with CA validation. If the user understands how to verify the domain and security of the connection the attack doesn't work, and if he doesn't, the Google vs Symantec situation makes no difference either.
It seems Google has the leverage, not Symantec.
A PR awareness campaign is out-of-band information that's separate from the web surfer actually navigating to a site. Millions of users would see a scary message similar to "This site's security certificate is not trusted!"[1].
To prevent scary security popups, which is more likely?
1) The website owners abandon Symantec and switch to a Certificate Authority not flagged by Chrome
or
2) Users get "educated" on Symantec's side of the story and manually add Symantec as a trusted root certificate. (Some can switch browsers but for many non-techies, that's a pain because they have all their bookmarks in Chrome -- and migrating them on mobile phone is not obvious.)
[1] https://www.google.com/search?q=google+chrome+this+site%27s+...
3) Large websites using Symantec certs start telling users Chrome is "broken" and we find out if users will switch browsers, not care about the security, and/or complain to the sites.
I definitely find any variation of #3 to be more likely than #2. I see it as a battle between #1 and #3.
I'm having a hard time thinking of a scenario where a large website concludes it's cheaper to convince web shoppers at ecommerce sites and web visitors at news sites to switch to Firefox/IE instead of the website just switching CA vendors.
If you're a website that wants to put up zero friction between buyers submitting their credit-card info and pay you money, why try to "educate" them? If you're a website that wants visitors to see your ads next to your journalists' stories, why make it more difficult than it has to be? Does Symantec as a CA offer up extra benefits that no other CA has such that it makes sense to "train" web visitors to switch browsers?
Of the millions of non-geeks that use Android phones, what % download and use Firefox instead of the default Chrome browser?
But note, it does not work for governments. They can, and will, put up a red banner instructing the user to install another browser (or in case of Firefox 52, explain how to disable updates so you can keep using NPAPI plugins).
irs.gov (Internal Revenue Service): Entrust CA
va.gov (Veterans Affairs) : Symantec CA
So if Symantec is the CA for a critical mass of government websites that won't abandon them, Google Chrome could lose this battle.
Without looking at traffic data (e.g Alexa), my intuition says the vast majority of web traffic is not government websites. If Veterans Affairs forces user to switch browsers, I'm guessing people would still use their Chrome browser for all the other websites because that's where all their bookmarks live.
As for non-government websites, I notice that Netflix.com currently has a Symantec Class 3 CA. I'm guessing Netflix would rather switch to another CA.
They don't have a formal proposal yet, such proposals take anywhere from 6-18 months to process once they come out, and so the IRS or Veterans Affairs won't be getting new certificates from them in 2017, but in 2018 that's definitely a possibility.
Of course, a US Federal Government CA in the Web PKI would be problematic for Google, Apple, Microsoft or Mozilla (all US corporations) to distrust later if things go wrong, this is doubtless why they ask to limit to one TLD, defusing concerns in advance...
Does anyone still use browser bookmarks?
Actually, just thinking about it, it might be even simpler than this. If Bank of America wanted to, couldn't they still host their redirect landing page over SSL with a valid non-Symantec certificate, and then redirect to the ie6.bankofamerica.com page which will continue to use the bad Symantec cert? If switching certs for their web infrastructure was really difficult and they didn't want to do it, they could just build a simple little front-end web server with a valid certificate to redirect people to an IE6 download page or ie6.bankofamerica.com.
This made me cry a little. But on a more serious note, every existing link on the Web is essentially a bookmark, so I don't think we can ignore that when discussing impact. (Though I'm betting all incoming requests could be rerouted more easily than telling your customers to (and how to) install a cert...)
My grandma still uses browser bookmarks, but I have no none-anecdotal source for this.
BoA could absolutely do all the things you just mentioned, but all of them are more difficult than simply replacing their certificate using Comodo or some other trusted root CA.
[1] https://w3techs.com/technologies/details/ce-hsts/all/all
That depends on the design of the site and their business policies. I agree though - for any sensible organization switching certs is going to be easier. But if that was really the case here, why were they asking Symantec for special favours?
Just in case you're not, if they went through all the trouble to get another cert for Chrome, why wouldn't they just use it for everyone?
4) Banks require Chrome 55, "here's a download", good thing it's open-source, and we get the IE6 story again.
Banks know this. Like the CA system, the whole banking system only functions because of trust, and in the US that trust is backed by the government. They aren't going to let that erode. Regardless of whether all their back-end certs get updated, their customer facing ones will if needed.
The general public doesn't care about inside baseball. Site operators can't afford not to work perfectly with Chrome.
The only effective solution to stop the pain will be to switch to a new cert as quickly as possible, and that only hurts Symantec, not Google
Google is playing with fire here. I would expect Symantec and other major business who stand to be negatively affected, especially the extremely large ones that Symantec was accommodating by skirting some of the EV rules, will immediately start pushing for regulations around this process. That's the easiest way for large companies to control this kind of thing.
I think the likely result here is more widespread adoption of LE. The point is that CA's shouldn't be businesses.
I think the idiom you want is "brought to heel".
IIRC that's Amazon's answer to 'how should a user install Amazon Prime on Android?' I don't know how successful they've been convincing users to allow installation of untrusted apps (I certainly haven't done it), but … probably more than a few have done it.
https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/07/changes-to... https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12061320 https://github.com/mitmproxy/mitmproxy/issues/2054
And it's really not the sort of thing your average non-technical user is likely to do - and trust me, having supported these users before, it's likely to go horribly wrong if you try providing steps for them.
Edit: Oh wait. Verisign and Thawte. Okay, that's some massive excrement on a collision course with the ventilation device.
The technology is available for any CA, existing or new, to copycat.
And if they don't want to use the open source reference implementation, they can cleanroom an ACME server that works with all the existing clients that work with letsencrypt.