Before leaks, "Thinking the government is monitoring everyone online and using their mobile devices to spy on them is insane, you conspiracy theorist."
After leaks, "This is barely news, everyone knew this already."
Every. Single. Time.
After leaks, "This is barely news, everyone knew this already."
Every. Single. Time.
By design, a zero day cannot be reasonably used for mass surveillance. Every endpoint targeted increases the chance of discovery. This is how many would probably prefer to see a spy agency be operating; Focus on their specific targets instead of dragnet surveillance.
As for this specific release, it requires physical access (and a very outdated OS).
If the CIA is able to use those zero days on systems which provide them access to larger sets of information, then what you're saying is objectively wrong.
https://www.sbir.gov/sbirsearch/detail/1203207. Like I said, differently ideology.
> Also included in this release is the manual for the CIA's "NightSkies 1.2" a "beacon/loader/implant tool" for the Apple iPhone. Noteworthy is that NightSkies had reached 1.2 by 2008, and is expressly designed to be physically installed onto factory fresh iPhones. i.e the CIA has been infecting the iPhone supply chain of its targets since at least 2008.
It seems that WikiLeaks has misunderstood the meaning of "factory fresh" in the manual. This simply means it is a new device. If you look at all the source documents, it appears that NightSkies was built under the user requirement that a CIA agent is in a position to gift a device to their target, pre-infected. Regardless of how one might feel about that practice, I think it is a big difference with regards to the "supply chain" phrasing because they mistakenly indicate that the infection would literally occur at the factory, and that is definitely not indicated in any of the documents.
I think many folks draw an (implicit, often subconscious) distinction between invasions of privacy that they care about, vs those they don't, and the former ties closely to the presence of a human mind on the other end of the wire. For most people it seems, the whole concept is linked much more closely to the fear of shame (e.g., your slightly bizarre kink will be outed to friends or family who might look at you differently) than to the fear that the regime will find out you are a threat to it, and will come after you.
In other words: because the CIA's computers don't care if I am a furry and are never going to tell what they hear, I don't have to care that they're listening.
People (rightfully) dismiss as insane the notion that some weird dude is sitting in the basement of the NSA listening to the details of your life, in particular (the NSA's basement and budget are not big enough to house enough weird dudes to listen to make the chance of your life being monitored any more than vanishingly small). But it's been pretty common knowledge for a very long time that if Power really wants to know something (whether it's about you or anything else), it has a pretty good chance of learning it.
Why do you think this is the case?
Has the government sufficient ability to secure data that the very fact they possess databases of information on US citizens isn't fundamentally problematic? Based on only the last year of breaches, I'd argue no.
> People (rightfully) dismiss as insane the notion that some weird dude is sitting in the basement of the NSA listening to the details of your life
That is not a claim that any rational critic of bulk surveillance makes. And, ya know, machine learning exists. They won't (or don't) need humans to analyze the data they collect.
> ...the whole concept is linked much more closely to the fear of shame...
Embedded journalists, activists, people with sensitive medical information.
This reference sample is very small if compared to the possibilities.
Everybody has something private that can be used to extort informations, to gain privileges or what-else.
The US is not in the position to assure the current surveillance infrastructure (and so the confidentiality of the data) will endure the centuries.
An example ? ...
When you read [https://byparker.com/blog/2016/tim-cook-s-privacy-battle-is-...],
knowing that back during the cold war the stasi used to target `a certain kind of people` (with romeos and wiretapping),
knowing that the stasi lost control of what are called "the pink files" and that we currently have no idea of whoever is benefiting from them,
you start to realise that what currently can be considered a non-issue may in the future be something very dangerous.
And? At risk populations are always minorities.
Journey Into the Whirlwind by Eugenia Ginzburg is a book you'd probably enjoy.
https://www.amazon.com/Journey-into-Whirlwind-Eugenia-Ginzbu...
Edit: the book seems great, I'm gonna buy it, thank you for the hint.