I really don't know how to unpick that knot, but I don't think it's an angle that should be ignored.
Definitely this angle on understanding the drive should not be ignored. An attempt to corroborate it - to unpick the knot - would require a great amount of study of the Chinese People's Party, of Xi Jinping's constituency, and both the consistency of and the timing of charges brought to bring in the high level fraud. Documents and communications from Jinping or his circle discussing "who to go after" would represent a smoking gun (of course we haven't even smelled anything like this).
I read an expose from Foreign Policy where they tried to build a case that Xi Jinping has been using it to consolidate power, but it was very clumsy and as its predictions and information came into question the investigative direction taken by the expose has been abandoned (as far as I can tell).
The way the anti-corruption drive has proceeded, as I understand, has been in tracking how government finances are being used and that the Chinese Government tends to find - using traditional accounting audits - rings of people who are enriching themselves using various schemes (though many times really obvious transfers into personal accounts). So far it has appeared that the anti-corruption effort has both been making an actual positive effect on government efficiency and that it has been primarily non-political and untargetted, focusing more on finding abuse of public funds than in chasing after any officials in particular.
> the publicity of the drive has damaged Chinese public confidence in their institutions of government
If Mr. Xi's goal were to stay on past the customary 10-year term, wouldn't he need to discredit the current institutions of government and portray himself as the antidote?
> many of the people taken to court have been in Xi Jinpeng's own circle
My overly-simplistic model of China's government is that it is basically a one-party system with a veneer of formality over back-room intra-party struggles (along with a regular calendar of leadership replacement to prevent too much consolidation of power around an individual, as happened to an extent with Deng Xiaoping in the aftermath of Mao's death). Under this model, official political power tends to correspond directly to internal party clout. So wouldn't anybody with enough clout to be a threat to Xi be likely to be found within his own circle (AKA, higher ups in the current government)? I admit I could be way off base in my analysis here, as I haven't studied China's government in depth.
> Documents and communications from Jinping or his circle discussing "who to go after" would represent a smoking gun (of course we haven't even smelled anything like this).
Just out of curiosity, have we seen any such documents or communications (on any subject) that weren't intended for public consumption? That seems like important context as to whether absence of evidence can realistically be considered evidence of absence.
Again, since you seem to have studied this in more detail than I have, I'm interested in your thoughts on these questions.
If Xi Jinping were to try to purge the Chinese Government (a highly paranoid organization, with military, intelligence and national security communities that far outlast his particular inter-party alignment) that would be incredible, shocking and enormous news.
> If Mr. Xi's goal were to stay on past the customary 10-year term, wouldn't he need to discredit the current institutions of government and portray himself as the antidote?
Maybe? Generally, the party is the face (you used the word veneer) of the government and its institutions. Weakening public opinion of the party only makes sense if Xi Jinping were pushing to replace the party system with a cult of personality. In the mind of the Chinese, Xi merely runs the party, and any damaged public opinion about the party reflects directly on public opinion about how Jinping is running it.
The kind of steps to become a cult of personality necessary to replace the party system just aren't being seen. You aren't seeing the government under Jinping trying to mass mobilize a change of public opinion to value his leadership over and above the party system.
Rather than discredit the current institutions of government he'd need to purge the institutions and norms which facilitate the cap on leadership and the interior modes for leadership to be replaced, as well as top brass in the People's Army that would enforce that - while pushing for the citizens of China to support such a transition. I have yet to read anything that makes a case that that's happening (much less a compelling one).
> Just out of curiosity, have we seen any such documents or communications (on any subject) that weren't intended for public consumption? That seems like important context as to whether absence of evidence can realistically be considered evidence of absence.
Yup. Take "Document Number 9" or the leaks regarding Ling Jihua or the leaks from the public diplomacy and strategic communication (propaganda) centers in China or the so called "50 Cent Party" - their version of the US's "Global Engagement Center".
Documents are leaked in China the same as they are leaked anywhere else. In any case, I'm just suggesting the type of really strong evidence you'd want to be able to reference to support a really strong claim. Unfortunately not enough leaks from any government are available to always have a "smoking gun" (though incredibly in the case of Brazil we got them, not that it mattered). I agree with you that absence of a leaked smoking gun is not evidence that it doesn't exist. My point was that there's nothing even close - so either the conspiracy is incredibly underground, has thought 15 moves ahead, and is going to manage to capture a government with a billion people even without taking the steps you'd expect to see - or it's a rumor similar to those about President Trump's, President Obama's, and President Putin's ambitions to overthrow their governments that were/are popular during their respective eras.
Color me really skeptical. I'm willing to believe it though - I would just need to see the right set of circumstances or the right set of leaked documents for it to make enough sense. Overall I'm much more interested in current affairs, geopolitics, and the potential ouster of Najib Razak in Malaysia and the workings of the next China party congress than these kinds of highly speculative and underevidenced theories.
The family name is Xi, just FYI.
Is it culturally unacceptable to refer to Xi Jinping as Jinping?
I have a brother that at one point regularly dealt with top levels of Chinese government. His summary was, "China is a country of crooks ruled by honest men; the USA is a country of honest men ruled by crooks." He's not sure which is worse in the end.
Based on that, I would bet on the top levels of the Chinese government being basically ethical (albeit within an ethical system that values life and liberty a lot less than we would).
Of course, stability is also quite useful for preserving power and enjoying the fruits of dubious wealth, so here the moral imperative dovetails neatly with the personal interests of party cadres.
For the record, the extent to which Americans can be trusted to be honest and trustworthy on a daily basis came as a shock to him after living in China for many years.
That doesn't mean there's no recourse. The mods actively respond to concerns like this. As I suggested above, you can contact them and they'll look into it.