One day, the shared mount on a ton of systems around the company just stopped working. The master node (these have internal redundancy at the network, controller, shelf, and disk level) had failed over to the redundant node, which after time had so many disks fail without being replace that it went down hard. They had to work with NetApp support (at great expense) to get it back up, which took a few days. The system had been attempting to warn the admins as best it could of the impending doom for the better part of a year, and no one noticed.
The moral of this story is that you can have big-dollar redundant systems, but if you don't also have some dollars going to the care and feeding of them, it's wasted. The other lesson here is that such systems don't exist in isolation and are only as good as their weakest link, which in this case was a now-unreachable SMTP server. Lastly, although the LCD displays were trying their best to also signal this fault condition, people who would walk by these physical machines were used to this, so they didn't bother to actually read the errors. Do that at the peril of anything dependent on that system.
This is the area were inverted Unix philosophy applies: Give me good news as well. A weekly mail, that backups (or the filer or RAID or whatever) works A-OK. If the mail stops coming, something broke.
Agreed. Another moral: Don't believe anything works until you see it with your own eyes.
It would be interesting where I am since you skip local crime and go straight to federal offense. Kept me away from booze in high school since its not minor in possessions, its federal bootlegging. I can only imagine what trying to enter a server room nets a person.
By the time it was being looked after by the third party maintainer they'd just leave us a few disks and a couple of fibre channel controllers onsite and we'd get the DC remote hands to swap them out. The faulty parts were then boxed up and couriered back to the maintenance company all on their dime.
There was not an awful lot of involvement on our end except for authorising access to the DC when an engineer needed to attend.
None of this was massively expensive (and this was 24x7x365 cover) in the great scheme of things given their mission critical status.
You have essentially described IBM's business model. You pay more, but if something goes wrong someone shows up.
Yes. They are expensive and deviously good at it. Or, at least they used to be many years ago.
Many years back I worked in a tiny town (1000 people?) four hours from the closest depot and we even got same day service. This cost a king's ransom. But the AS/400 ran most of the business...
I think the bigger IBM z machines do allow zero-time upgrades, but the iSeries (new name for AS/400) is basically a reboot the machine affair. I've never heard of Sysplex in regards to the iSeries.
They sent me two DVDs with 12 pages of instructions. The unnumbered first page is release notes and a notice that physical media deliveries would be an average of 5 to 9 business days on Jan 31, 2007 and beyond. (odd notice for a 2016 document)
Page 1 has my customer information with all sorts of tracking numbers. It also include the number of selected files (1,360), Kilo-bytes (sp) of data (3,963,529), fixes (3,394 fixes with 815 Kilo-bytes of data were superceded), etc.
Pre-install instructions finally show up on page 3 and the big warning about f'n it up shows on page 4. Page 6 brings us to the actual install which is written to be typed exactly with exact detailed results of each step.
to give an example
2. Load the image catalog into the virtual optical
device using the following command:
LODIMGCLG IMGCLG(ptfcatalog) DEV(OPTVRTxx) OPTION(*LOAD)
3. Type GO PTF and press the Enter key
4. Take menu option 8 and press Enter key
Took about an two hours counting the the 45 minute reboot. We have a very old and slow machine (need to buy a new one in the next two years, we are at a decade of use now) so reboots are a bit slow.https://www.vmssoftware.com/about_faq.html#faq1
They didn't buy it. HP is too greedy about the lucrative revenue & maybe patents they get off VMS that made me wonder why they killed it in the first place. Instead, it appears (not certain) that VMS Software Inc gets some OEM-like license that puts them in control of it while HP still owns it, can license it themselves (probably existing customers), and likely gets a portion of VMS Software Inc's licensing revenue. So, they've pushed off almost all responsibility for it onto another company without actually selling it or losing all the revenue.
Still a good development for VMS customers. Both legacy and people who will suffer through archaic stuff to reap benefits of bulletproof clusters. I'd be happy to. :) Only problem is it's basically got no security attention over the years with plenty of zero days or configuration issues lurking in there. If I deployed in a company, I plan to put network guards in front of it to absorb attacks while converting the traffic into something easy to process. Ideally, a PCI-based guard that forces it to only talk to the application's memory instead of rest of system. Plus safe-coded apps (Rust, Ada) and API wrappers to try to spot BS. That VMS supports cross-language development will probably help.
EDIT: The weird thing is they finished a port to Alpha ISA before they got to x86 ISA for migrations. I thought Alpha's already migrated to Itanium. Didn't see that coming lol.
http://h41379.www4.hpe.com/openvms/whitepapers/high_avail.ht...