Here are some sections I think are interesting for people who don't have time to read all eleven parts:
> We were proposing to triple our expenses, while only doubling our sales. More concerning, we were proposing to double our staff size, without increasing our ability to produce films. Of the 165 hires being requested, only a handful were in the animation studio. Ninety percent were in finance, HR, marketing, licensing and design. So at 315 people we would be able to produce no more videos per year than we had produced five years earlier with a staff of 10.
> Did I want to release all of this product? Did every last bit of it have a compelling ministry objective? Did it all fit into my “masterplan” to benefit America's kids? Frankly, no. None of it was against our mission, and most of it promoted a biblical value or virtue in some way, shape or form, but the sheer volume was driven not by mission, but by a desperate need to keep Big Idea from collapsing. Many of us felt the tension between our ministry-driven mission and the vast amount of merchandise we were attempting to drive into the market. The pace of work, however, left precious little time for introspection.
> There were no comparables for VeggieTales. Our sales had skyrocketed 3300% in four years! Against that backdrop, how do you project the future? More skyrocketing? Was our growth almost done, or just getting started? Look at another example: Between Christmas 2003 and Christmas 2004, sales of Apple's iPod increased by a staggering 500%. A huge success, but also a huge challenge. How many iPods do you make for Christmas 2005? 500% more than 2004? 100% more? 10% less? Unprecedented success is extremely difficult to manage simply because it is unprecedented. Every year is a big ol' guess.
> I was a shy kid who would rather read Starlog Magazine or build a rudimentary optical printer out of cannibalized 8mm projectors than show up at the prom or run for student government. As VeggieTales took off, I became terrified that my business inexperience and lack of people skills would result in Big Idea's failure. So, in a panic, I brought in others to help, often spending far too little time getting to know them before or after the hire. I then backed down from my own convictions, assuming that an executive with an impressive resume surely knew better than a Bible college dropout.
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So many decisions involving tens of millions of dollars were made based on nothing concrete. Not even gut feeling. Just blind hope.
And it's horrible because the stuff they guessed about is knowable to some extent. I seriously doubt Apple goes into Christmas having no clue what the iPod demand will be. It seems like simple market research would have clued them in.
Interesting too is the settling that happened in picking the first executive team. He couldn't convince the best people to move, so he settled for second tier. That seems like a horrible decision: spending just as much money with lower chances of success.
I'm sad to see the company go down, but some of the decisions made were just dumb: Obviously a cheap, 2D spinoff is not going to be as successful as its parent. Why would you agonize over firing 30 people when the entire company is going bankrupt in months?
There's a lot to think about in this story.