"I used to think if there was reincarnation, I wanted to come back as the president or the pope or a .400 baseball hitter. But now I want to come back as the bond market. You can intimidate everybody." - James Carville
"I used to think if there was reincarnation, I wanted to come back as the president or the pope or a .400 baseball hitter. But now I want to come back as the bond market. You can intimidate everybody." - James Carville
You can try to leave a general hedge for unknowns, like never giving anything >99% long term confidence. But actually pricing black swan problems accurately should be impossible, pretty much by definition.
In case of mortgage bonds, the bill payers were bond creators who wanted to get the loans off their books as quickly as possible. The buyers should really know better but they too were largely managers whose salary was paid on % of assets basis with no real downside impact on their own wealth.
Note: making wrong assumptions (explicitly stated) about the future is not fraud. I.e., "I think housing will never go down" is not fraud.
When challenged on this they usually claim the first amendment (i.e. license to lie), although S&P went a step further and downgraded the US in a fit of rage when the SEC started investigating them for ratings fraud in 2011. Ironically interest rates on US treasuries went slightly down afterwards.
At the time, the US government was actively considering whether to default on US Treasuries. The downgrade wasn't some petty revenge.
Their rationale was, in any case, that "entitlements spending" was too high:
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/aug/06/sandp-debt-...
The entire rest of the market (and the other ratings agencies) were just about able to determine that if you have the keys to the cash printer you're actually not in danger of running out of cash and political bickering doesn't translate into risk of political suicide.
When actual credit events look likely it triggers a sharp rise in interest rates. It looks like this:
https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-9UVV9J6AdU0/TzxG9W26TsI/AAAAAAAAC...
That did not happen. Nothing happened. Not even a blip. The market (correctly) assessed this as being the usual partisan political bickering.
Even the ghost of a chance of going down to the wire as to whether a bond payment would be missed by a single day on US obligations, is in itself tremendously disruptive. The economy is structured around U.S. debt as being the safest paper there is. Don't downplay just how dangerous dicking around with this for partisan points was.
As I said before: the markets correctly characterized the debt ceiling negotiations as a bunch of drama queens on both sides of the political divide acting up & a storm in a teacup because neither side is politically suicidal.
Ted Yoho, rep for Florida, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-tea-partys-gov...
Trump (who isn't in congress, but had a shot at being president: http://mediamatters.org/research/2016/05/08/media-slam-trump...)
yes, it is nuts, but people who vote in congress supported it, and the pres. candidate of one of our two parties also said that.
Various parties are required to trust that anything rated D or whatever is risky. They aren't required to trust that AAAAAA+ means risk-free.
In real life, this sort of sophistry only makes terms like "risk-free" and "black" useless.
I fully expect that energy companies have already started to diversify and buy into industries that could disrupt their earnings. Good successful corporations know when to move, RJ Reynolds is probably the best example of a company diversifying when its main product started to become a liability.
Private investors and tax payers are the only victims. The first because their investment is gone and the second who has to pay to fix the the public employee pension funds that may have purchased the same bonds which means the first party is actually stung twice
A government uses debt to pay for stuff. If it defaults on its own debt, it hurts its ability to generate funds without printing currency. So if a government defaults, it not only incites domestic panic and foreign wariness of its markets, it also loses the ability to affordably borrow to pay for programs that can right the ship.
Even for companies where bonds are pricing in a substantial probability of default, it's a big deal if they fail to service their debts. Sprint can survive a 30% drop in its stock price. It probably can't survive defaulting on 30% of its debt.
Nope.
The US Federal Reserve did three rounds of QE, and round three ended in October, 2014. This is not an ongoing program.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantitative_easing#US_QE1.2C_...
No that is actually not true. You'll find the broken window theory espoused by dingbat modern economists[1] and business people[2] but not hoary old Keynesians and NeoKeynesians. Keynesians believe somethings different which is that if you have a demand and production shortfall due to excess debt and fear (dread zero bound), then the government can help by creating demand. AKA borrow money to pay for labor and materials and use that to build useful stuff. Experience from WWII in the US shows that it'll work even if the stuff is not very useful.
[1] Because modern economics isn't an applied science practitioners are allowed to believe what they want about the real economy.
[2] Leaned about the broken window theory at the country club bar.
Maybe I over-read it at the time, but I got the same feeling after reading a history of the 1500s Mediterranean countries (Braudel's "The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II"), more exactly that the a very great injustice had been made to the bankers of the time (mostly the Genoese and Fugger family) for not getting their money back from the King of Spain, to which they had lent a lot of money (it's like they had gotten a big haircut on present-day Government bonds). There's an interesting discussion about that at this link: http://history.stackexchange.com/questions/4432/what-were-th...
But when bonds default people start losing trust in fiduciary instruments. And trust is much more difficult to build than pure value.
Fannie/Freddie bonds before the housing crash were a perfect example of this. All the information marketing the bonds came with specific warnings that they were not backed by the US government and didn't carry any "explicit or implied" government guarantee. Of course, this turned out to be bunk, and the bond markets knew it, which is why Fannie and Freddie were able to borrow money at lower rates than everyone else. When push came to shove, everyone knew Fannie and Freddie were too big to fail and the government would have to bail them out. I wouldn't be surprised if history repeats itself.
?! I'm not sure what you mean by that, but value is rather hard to create. Certainly the value in real estate and physical goods. Stock value and services are a bit more ephemeral.
But the reason Keyensian hole-digging makes sense is that labour is a wasting good - you can't store the output of people who would otherwise be unemployed, and having people unemployed does long term damage to productivity.
We aren't talking about literal hole-digging. There are a ton of infrastructure projects in America (highways, bridges, etc.) that could use the labor in construction.
The only sense in which value is destroyed is if the money ends up in the hands of someone who less productive at invest it. But that can't really be predicted. If value is lost in a default, the value was already destroyed in the past, regardless default choice.
Bankruptcy causes real destruction of value as inventory is sold at liquidation prices and the concentration of knowledge and organisation that makes a firm valuable in the first place evaporates.
That's a crass (although depressingly common) straw man of one of Keynes' views.
He mentioned that paying people to dig a hole/fill it up was one way - though emphatically not the most efficient way you could escape from a liquidity trap.
"It is curious how common sense, wriggling for an escape from absurd conclusions, has been apt to reach a preference for wholly ‘wasteful’ forms of loan expenditure rather than for partly wasteful forms, which, because they are not wholly wasteful, tend to be judged on strict ‘business’ principles. For example, unemployment relief financed by loans is more readily accepted than the financing of improvements at a charge below the current rate of interest; whilst the form of digging holes in the ground known as gold-mining, which not only adds nothing whatever to the real wealth of the world but involves the disutility of labour, is the most acceptable of all solutions." - Keynes
If one looks at the composition of debt 1920-1950 what happened during WWII is the US government essentially took all of the commercial and consumer debt onto it's own books.
http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2016/03/11/470136949/episo...
A better point might be, why were they lent money in the first place?!?
Unless the government, which has the power to break the agreement, breaks the agreement.
The history of finance is well-woven with the thread of sovereign defaults.
I'm just thinking that by the time a state defaults on bonds the "rich man" may be facing a bundle of problems.
How much would diversification help in those circumstances?
For a while during the 07-09 financial crisis, Coca-Cola bonds were priced by the market as less risky than Treasury bonds.
Large multinational corporations are probably safer than the riskiest countries if that's what you're asking.
Their reasoning is that the bond market is like a giant, distributed bank. Bondholders borrow short-term, and invest long-term, thus providing liquidity for businesses that need to make long term investment.
The problem is, we have no idea what the actual economics of liquidity provision is. The standard Diamond–Dybvig model is used to justify bailing out the banks (and also the "shadow" banks, i.e. the bond market) when things go bad. But if the Diamond–Dybvig model is correct, then liquidity provision is a mechanical process that could be done just as well by the government, and the bond market is just a way to get the free market to do this at exorbitant cost.
We need better theories to understand liquidity. I think the best work in this area is by Holmstrom and Tirole. Holmstrom's nobel price should help raise the profile of this work.
>My rough definition of a financial crisis is that it's when someone borrows money from someone else, and can't pay it back, and it is politically and socially unacceptable not to pay it back.
Breaking windows is a stupid way to crate liquidity though. Better to do some debt-financed spending without destroying anything. For example, the USA's CCC and TVA, that started ending the Great Depression.
But do recall that people said the same thing before World War I. All you need is some yahoo to kill the wrong person .
Can confirm.