Good idea where possible, but "all their data" will be problematic in many social science studies, and also in medicine, because of privacy laws.
Good idea where possible, but "all their data" will be problematic in many social science studies, and also in medicine, because of privacy laws.
And given what the adtech space has been able to figure out pretty easily in terms of tracking even people who take serious steps to avoid it, you should not think that there is any reasonable amount of "anonymization" that can make otherwise-useful medical details safe to release.
Because the order of the entries in the bag of words is arbitrary, and the words have been hashed, it is impossible to go back from a bag of words representation to the original email. I don't know if this is what google does, but it is pretty normal to do so.
We took at look at this recently [3], and it turns out that mapping the word numbers back to the original words is actually a lot more doable than you'd think.
[1] ShadowCrypt: Encrypted Web Applications for Everyone http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2660267.2660326
[2] Mimesis Aegis: A Mimicry Privacy Shield–A System’s Approach to Data Privacy on Public Cloud https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity14/technical...
[3] The Shadow Nemesis: Inference Attacks on Efficiently Deployable, Efficiently Searchable Encryption https://www.sigsac.org/ccs/CCS2016/agenda/
http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/special-t...
The way I read it, the "Safe Harbor" part of that standard allows keeping around part of the zip code if that designates over 20,000 people.
For such a group of just over 20,000, add in birth year and sex (both allowed), and you're down to smallest groups of around 200 people. For the topic at hand (publish the data set so that critics can draw their own conclusions), often general health, education level and race, maybe even line of work (blue collar/white collar/agriculture) must be added, so that critics can check that your sample is representative.
I bet that gets you down to a single person in quite a few of those groups.
Yes, they end with "The covered entity does not have actual knowledge that the information could be used alone or in combination with other information to identify an individual who is a subject of the information.", but the earlier list doesn't make me confident that the USA federal government can make that judgment.
No it can't. Some data can be anonymized, some can't.
You don't have to solve everything yourself. That's the whole point of a peer driven scientific community.