http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?artic...
Obviously, this shouldn't be seen as a defense of plea deals, merely an explanation of one of the incentives that currently exist for them.
Properly funding our court systems would remove this incentive.
In the US, the prosecution can't appeal a verdict in a criminal trial. In some cases, you could be tried for the same crime in a different jurisdiction though (likely with a different prosecution as well).
A federal crime and a state crime, even if based on the same act, are different crimes. (Usually, even if they have similar popular names, with substantially different definitions.)
> (although not as a federal crime and a Puerto Rico crime).
Puerto Rico is a federal territory, therefore that would be a "federal crime" and a "federal crime".
While Puerto Rico may have local government that looks a lot like a state in its relation to the federal government (and which is treated as a state under a lot of federal statutes), Constitutionally it is not a separate sovereignty like a State, but simply an appendage of the Federal government.
There are some major issues with this though; there are many people who are likely innocent but plea guilty because they can't afford bail, and if they miss work they will lose their jobs.
Plea deals happen a lot because of the sheer volume of criminal cases; from the prosecutors point of view they reduce the variability of outcome, as well as the work needed to get the outcome, which makes it possible to handle a larger caseload.
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Also as the paper posted by a sibling comment points out, jury trials in the US are incredibly resource intensive, and it is only in the last century or so that they have become so. 97% of federal convictions are from guilty pleas.
So, let's say that you're in a group of 10 people and one of them will suffer an 8X loss, but you don't know who. You each set aside X, and pay 9X to the guy who turns out to take the loss. (Refund of contribution plus 8X.) You pay X for the overhead of managing the arrangement. Boom, you reinvented insurance.
There are cases where the evidence is strong, but neither side likes the uncertainty of leaving it up to the trial, so they make the above tradeoff, and save on the costs.
As for your question about "why not have a mini-trial anyway", the prosecution is required to disclose their evidence at the allocution, so there (some level) is transparency about the basis for guilt; but if you have to commit to the regular trial with all its procedures and protections, then that defeats most of the purpose.
Often, people confusedly moralize about plea bargains, when their real objection is that the government could credibly claim to be able to get an 8X penalty at all, which seems excessive given the facts of the case.
Also, not just an American thing: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plea_bargain#Use_in_civil_law_...
The justice system in the US is "adversarial." The product of the process is the verdict. Any official information entered into the public record is a side product, not a primary.
In cases where a prosecutor thinks the public information is more important, they have the option of not pursuing a deal.
Curious what country you are in where that's normal. Definitely not in the US. If the defendant admits their guilt, there isn't a trial in the US at all, it's done.