Free will is akin to an emotion. Just because physicists haven't explained it in excruciating detail doesn't mean it doesn't exist, or we'd all be running around debating the existence of fear and love and curiosity.
Free will is akin to an emotion. Just because physicists haven't explained it in excruciating detail doesn't mean it doesn't exist, or we'd all be running around debating the existence of fear and love and curiosity.
Someone who studies these things (a psychologist or neurologist) could make even more sophisticated predictions.
We may not have a complete low-level electrochemical model of these phenomenon, but we have a good enough model to make some predictions. But if anything, one of the most salient criticisms of free will is that it doesn't allow us to model and make predictions--in fact, it eschews predictions altogether.
No. Free will is the ability to make a choice not completely dependent on history.
Isn't that like saying I want to fly, so I don't have free will if I can't?
If you respond, "No, because the particles that make up the coin and the muscles that drive my thumbnail have a history that determines the outcome," then how about a slight variation? "I can't decide what to do. I have no idea what time it is, so if the minute digit on my clock is odd, I'll do X, otherwise I'll do Y."
Here I've explicitly refrained from using either a source of randomness or anything else with its own history to determine my fate. The decision to consult the clock might have been an act of free will on my part, but the outcome certainly wasn't.
Nobody would argue that they had free will if they didn't feel like they had free will. Nobody is positing baseless metaphysical nonsense without some reverence in their actual experiences. If you want to usefully discuss free will, you have to account for the sensation of free will, not just some abstract model that you've merely assembled grammatical statements from.