In banks, significant decisions (like personally authorising multimillion dollar transfer) require two signatures (of two senior officers), so they can't be abused by just one person going rogue.
It can be imagined that we apply the same approach for system administration - "pair-programming" work only, perhaps with proximity cards which detect when one of the admins is actually not at the desk.
"Two-Person Control Administration: Preventing Administation Faults through Duplication" by Shaya Potter, Steve Bellovin, and Jason Nieh
https://www.usenix.org/conference/lisa-09/two-person-control...
The video isn't there for some reason, but the paper and audio of the presentation are.
In contrast the banker has a more relaxing experience putting his signature on a document. It's stressful enough running root commands sometimes, and I can't imagine how horrible it would be to require a second person to be on-call/pair/double-check/etc. I would have long ago quit the profession, which would be impossible to do anything in. Also systems would take longer to fix, so organizations would be displeased.
Vet your sys admins correctly before hiring, keep an eye on people's stress levels, which in 2016 America apparently doesn't matter to anyone anymore in IT, and don't piss off the sys admin.
basically don't allow people to commit changes directly to the underlying system, require the changes from 2 administrators to be captured and then compare them for equivalence. (what equivalence means can be bit for bit equality at the most basic binary level, or perhaps some parsing that can verify equivalence at language level for configurations)
if the changes are equivalent commit them. otherwise point out the differences.
As the paper also discusses, can be used with a single administrator to make the administration auditable, simply capture all changes before they are committed.